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JUDICIARY AND PENAL LAW CONTEMPT IN
NEW YORK: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
Lawrence N. Gray*
Judiciary and Penal Law Contempt proceedings in New York
have markedly increased in recent years.' However, courts have
imprecisely expressed the nature of contempt,2 inaccurately cited
precedent,3 reluctantly imposed contempt sanctions4 and reflected
improvident policy-making in their actions and opinions pertaining
to contempt. As a result, contemnors who go unpunished appear to
be above the law, and the public's confidence in justice suffers
accordingly.
" The author is presently Deputy Director of the New York City Regional
Office of the New York State Special Prosecutor for Medicaid Fraud Control.
Substantial portions of this article are based on concepts included in
LAWRENCE N. GRAY, THE GRAND JURY IN NEW YoRK (1994).
' Contempt proceedings arising out of grand jury investigations or trials of
white-collar, official corruption, organized and civil rights crime, have steadily
increased in New York from 1920 through the present. See LAWRENCE N. GRAY,
CRIMINAL CONTEMPT HANDBOOK (1994).
2 See, e.g., People v. Colombo, 29 N.Y.2d 1, 4, 271 N.E.2d 694, 696, 323
N.Y.S.2d 161, 164 (1971) (Court of Appeals considered criminal contempt to be
civil in nature), vacated, 405 U.S. 9 (1972); cf. McCormick v. Axelrod, 59
N.Y.2d 574, 583, 453 N.E.2d 508, 512, 466 N.Y.S.2d 279, 283, amended, 60
N.Y.2d 652, 454 N.E.2d 1314, 467 N.Y.S.2d 571 (1983); Goodman v. State, 31
N.Y.2d 381, 385, 292 N.E.2d 665, 667, 340 N.Y.S.2d 393, 395 (1972) (Court
of Appeals considered criminal contempt to be punitive or criminal in nature).
3 See, e.g., People v. Stewart, 158 Misc.2d 776, 601 N.Y.S.2d 983 (Sup. Ct.
1993), appealfiled, No. 91-3150 (1st Dep't June 4, 1993); Kuriansky v. Azam,
151 Misc.2d 176, 573 N.Y.S.2d 369 (Sup. Ct. 1991).
4 See Lawrence N. Gray, Order in the Court: Where Has It Gone?, N.Y.L.J.,
June 19, 1989, at 1.
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INTRODUCTION
[C]ourts of justice are universally acknowledged to be
vested, by their very creation, with power to impose
silence, respect and decorum in their presence and submis-
sion to their lawful mandates, and, as a corollary to this
proposition, to preserve themselves and their officers from
the approach of insults and pollution.'
Historically, English and American courts have had the inherent
power to punish parties for contempt for as long as those courts
have been in existence.6 When the judiciary exercises its inherent
contempt power, it vindicates and preserves its own authority and
existence as an institution of our separated government. By
exercising its inherent contempt power, the judiciary also gives
effect to the law's purpose of punishing or modifying a
contemnor's behavior, thus benefiting either the public generally or
private suitors individually.7
' United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 33 (1812), cited with
approval in International Union - United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 114
S. Ct. 2552 (1994).
6 Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 512-13 (1873), cited with
approval in International Union - United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 114
S. Ct. 2552 (1994).
7 International Union - United Mine Workers of Am., 114 S. Ct. 2552
(1994). Statutes regulating the exercise of the judiciary's inherent contempt
power are limitations on, not conferrals of such power. See, e.g., Nye v. United
States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941); People exrel. Munsell v. Court of Oyer& Terminer,
101 N.Y. 245, 4 N.E. 259 (1886); Gabrelian v. Gabrelian, 108 A.D.2d 445, 451,
489 N.Y.S.2d 914, 919-20 (2d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 66 N.Y.2d 741, 488
N.E.2d 111, 497 N.Y.S.2d 365 (1985). For purposes of this Article's analysis,
the following New York statutes illustrate the regulation of the judiciary's
inherent contempt powers. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 750 (McKinney 1993), in part,
provides:
Power of Courts to Punish for Criminal Contempts
A. A court of record has power to punish for a criminal contempt, a
person guilty of any of the following acts, and no others:
1. Disorderly, contemptuous, or insolent behavior, committed
during its sitting, in its immediate view and presence, and
directly tending to interrupt its proceedings or to impair the
respect due its authority.
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While the courts' power over Judiciary Law contempt is
inherent, their power over Penal Law contempt is legislatively
conferred. Penal Law crimes of contempt are distinct, yet
conceptual cousins to the inherent contempt powers wielded by the
courts. Although the enforcement of judiciary contempt law
preserves a court's authority and the rights of the parties involved,
under penal contempt law, courts generally impose sentences as
punishment for transgressions of the public's rights.8
3. Willful disobedience to its lawful mandate.
4. Resistance willfully offered to its lawful mandate.
5. Contumacious and unlawful refusal to be sworn as a
witness; or after being sworn, to answer any legal and proper
interrogatory.
N.Y. JUD. LAW § 753 (McKinney 1993), in part, provides:
Power of Courts to Punish for Civil Contempts
A. A court of record has power to punish, by fine and imprisonment,
or either, a neglect or violation of duty, or other misconduct, by which
a right of a party to a civil action or special proceeding, pending in the
court may be defeated, impaired, impeded or prejudiced in any of the
following cases:
1. [F]or disobedience to a lawful mandate of the court, or of
a judge thereof ....
2. A person subpoenaed as a witness, for refusing or
neglecting to obey the subpoena, or to attend, or to be sworn,
or to answer as a witness.
8. In any other case, where an attachment or any other
proceeding to punish for a contempt, has been usually
adopted and practiced in a court of record, to enforce a civil
remedy in that court, or to protect the right of a party.
While the courts' power over Judiciary Law contempt is inherent, their
power over Penal Law contempt is legislatively conferred. N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 215.51 (McKinney 1993) provides as follows:
Criminal Contempt in the First Degree
A person is guilty of criminal contempt in the first degree when he
contumaciously and unlawfully refuses to be sworn as a witness before a
grand jury, or when after having been sworn as a witness before a grand
jury, he refuses to answer any legal and proper interrogatory.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.50 (McKinney 1993), in part, provides:
Criminal Contempt in the Second Degree
A person is guilty of criminal contempt in the second degree when he
engages in any of the following conduct: (1) Disorderly, contemptuous, or
insolent behavior, committed during the sitting of a court, in its immediate
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To analyze judiciary and penal contempt law, this Article
reviews and questions New York Court of Appeals decisions
construing New York Judiciary Law sections 750, 751 and 753, as
well as New York Penal Law sections 215.50 and 215.51. Section
II of this Article reveals the judiciary's failure to clearly define
New York contempt law and its components as pertain to grand
jury witnesses. Section III and section IV discuss how this
ambiguity causes an inconsistent interpretation and inadequate
enforcement of contempt law in New York. Section V examines
how decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court and New York's
appellate courts affect the adjudication and punishment of con-
tempts committed in the immediate view and presence of a court.
Finally, this Article concludes that statutory revision and case law
reformation are long overdue in New York to put the appropriate
force behind a court's decision on the law and its order command-
ing the law's implementation.
I. NEW YORK JUDICIARY'S CONTEMPT POWER: INHERENT, BUT
REGULATED BY STATUTE AND NECESSITY
A court lacking the power to coerce obedience of its orders or
punish disobedience thereof is an oxymoron. In the United States,
"the contempt power lies at the core of the administration of a
state's judicial system."9 A court without contempt power is not a
court. 10
view and presence and directly tending to interrupt its proceedings or to
impair the respect due to its authority; or (2) Breach of the peace, noise or
other disturbance, directly tending to interrupt a court's proceedings; or (3)
Intentional disobedience or resistance to the lawful process or other mandate
of a court ... ; or (4) Contumacious and unlawful refusal to be sworn as
a witness in any court proceeding or, after being sworn, to answer any legal
and proper interrogatory ....
9 Juidice v. Vali, 430 U.S. 327, 335 (1977) (quoting with approval Ketchum
v. Edwards, 153 N.Y. 534, 539, 47 N.E. 918, 920 (1897)); see also Eilenbecker
v. District Court, 134 U.S. 31, 36 (1890).
"0 See, e.g., K. Wolferen, THE ENIGMA OF JAPANESE POWER 225 (1989)
(Japanese "courts," which have no contempt powers, are actually administrative
tribunals).
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Judicial contempt power, which is nondelegable" and exercis-
able only in open court,12 has two facets--criminal, or public,
contempt and civil, or private, contempt. 3 The division of
judiciary contempt law into criminal contempt and civil contempt
resulted, to a large extent, from the tension between the public's
need for a judiciary capable of enforcing its own orders and the
public's abhorrence of unchecked governmental power over
personal liberty. A criminal contempt of court violates the public's
rights generally, since the court is an instrument of public justice.
Such a violation warrants punitive imprisonment or an imposed fine
to vindicate the court. 14 In contrast, a civil contempt of court
violates the rights of civil litigants or private parties. A civil
contempt warrants the vindication of private rights through coercive
imprisonment, fines, or monetary indemnity. 15
" Goldberg v. Extraordinary Special Grand Juries, 69 A.D.2d 1, 7, 418
N.Y.S.2d 695, 698 (4th Dep't), appeal denied, 48 N.Y.2d 608, 399 N.E.2d 1205,
424 N.Y.S.2d 1026 (1979); People ex rel. Steams v. Marr, 88 A.D. 422, 424, 84
N.Y.S. 965, 966 (4th Dep't 1903), aff'd in part, 181 N.Y. 463, 74 N.E. 431
(1905).
12 See, e.g., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 264-65 (1948); In re Rosahn, 671
F.2d 690, 696-97 (2d Cir. 1982). See generally Westchester Rockland
Newspapers, Inc. v. Leggett, 48 N.Y.2d 430, 438, 399 N.E.2d 518, 522, 423
N.Y.S.2d 630, 634-35 (1979); People v. Jones, 47 N.Y.2d 409, 391 N.E.2d 1335,
418 N.Y.S.2d 359, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 946 (1979); Poughkeepsie Newspapers,
Inc. v. Rosenblatt, 92 A.D.2d 232, 459 N.Y.S.2d 857 (2d Dep't 1983).
"3 Hicks ex rel. Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624 (1988); Michaelson v.
United States ex rel. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 266 U.S. 42 (1924);
McCormick v. Axelrod, 59 N.Y.2d 574, 453 N.E.2d 508, 466 N.Y.S.2d 279,
amended, 60 N.Y.2d 652, 454 N.E.2d 1314, 467 N.Y.S.2d 571 (1983); Douglas
v. Adel, 269 N.Y. 144, 146, 199 N.E. 35, 36 (1935); In re Barnes, 204 N.Y.
108, 113-15, 97 N.E. 508, 509-10 (1912); People ex rel. Munsell v. Court of
Oyer& Terminer, 101 N.Y. 245, 4 N.E. 259 (1886); Gabrelianv. Gabrelian, 108
A.D.2d 445, 451, 489 N.Y.S.2d 914, 920 (2d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 66
N.Y.2d 741, 488 N.E.2d 111, 497 N.Y.S.2d 365 (1985).
'4 Department of Envtl. Protectionv. Department of Envtl. Conservation, 70
N.Y.2d 233, 513 N.E.2d 706, 519 N.Y.S.2d 539 (1987); County of Nassau v.
Adjunct Faculty Ass'n, 65 N.Y.2d 672, 481 N.E.2d 254, 491 N.Y.S.2d 622
(1985); People ex rel. Munsell v. Court of Oyer & Terminer, 101 N.Y. 245, 4
N.E. 259 (1886).
"s Munsell, 101 N.Y. at 247-49, 4 N.E. at 259-61; see also Gompers v.
Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911).
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A Judiciary Law criminal contempt of court may occur in the
court's immediate view and presence as well as outside its
presence. Aside from calling the sitting judge colorful epithets in
the language of the street, other examples of "immediate-view-and-
presence" criminal contempt include brawling with court officers
while they are seeking to carry out the court's order, 6 refusing to
answer questions as a witness (absent privilege) when ordered to do
so, 17 advising a client, in the court's presence, to disobey an order
which the court has just given to the client 8 and raising a fist of
"defiant salute" as part of a group courtroom disturbance. 9 The
usual case of Judiciary Law criminal contempt of court, however,
involves disobedience occurring outside the court's presence.
Common examples are disobedience of grand jury subpoenas duces
tecum and ad testificandum outright, or disobedience of orders
sustaining subpoenas against legal challenge.20 Punishment for a
New York Judiciary Law criminal contempt of court is up to thirty
days in jail and a fine of up to one thousand dollars.2'
16 See, e.g., Exparte Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888).
17 United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309 (1975); Ex parte Hudgings, 249
U.S. 378, 382 (1919); O'Neil v Kasler, 53 A.D.2d 310, 385 N.Y.S.2d 684 (4th
Dep't 1976); People v. Clinton, 42 A.D.2d 815, 346 N.Y.S.2d 345 (3d Dep't
1973).
18 Davis v. Goodson, 635 S.W.2d 226 (Ark. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1154 (1983).
19 Katz v. Murtagh, 28 N.Y.2d 234, 269 N.E.2d 816, 321 N.Y.S.2d 104
(1971).
20 See, e.g., Gold v. Menna, 25 N.Y.2d 475, 255 N.E.2d 235, 307 N.Y.S.2d
33 (1969); Koota v. Colombo, 17 N.Y.2d 147, 216 N.E.2d 568, 269 N.Y.S.2d
393, cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1001 (1966); Spector v. Allen, 281 N.Y. 251, 22
N.E.2d 360 (1939); Kuriansky v. Ali, 176 A.D.2d 728, 574 N.Y.S.2d 805 (2d
Dep't 1991), appeal dismissed, 79 N.Y.2d 848, 588 N.E.2d 93, 580 N.Y.S.2d
195 (1992); Ferrara v. Hynes, 63 A.D.2d 675, 404 N.Y.S.2d 674 (2d Dep't
1978); Manning v. Valente, 272 A.D. 358, 72 N.Y.S.2d 88 (1st Dep't), aff'd,
297 N.Y. 681, 77 N.E.2d 3 (1947); People ex rel. Cirillo v. Warden of the City
Prison, 14 A.D.2d 875 (2d Dep't 1961), aff'd, 11 N.Y.2d 51, 181 N.E.2d 424,
226 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1962); Second Additional Grand Jury v. Cirillo, 16 A.D.2d
605, 230 N.Y.S.2d 303 (2d Dep't 1962), aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d 206, 188 N.E.2d 138,
237 N.Y.S.2d 709 (1963).
21 N.Y. JUD. LAW § 752 (McKinney 1993). The punishment for a Judiciary
Law civil contempt includes imprisonment until the witness agrees to obey the
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In New York, Judiciary Law criminal contempt is further
distinguished from Judiciary Law civil contempt by the legislature's
definition of each. The legislature limited criminal contempts of
court to specifically enumerated acts.22 For civil contempts of
court, however, the legislature has preserved a common law catch-
all.23 This catch-all was deemed prudent and consistent with the
fact that civil litigation affects only private interests where courts
are under little or no temptation to abuse their power. In contrast,
criminal contempt always poses the danger of abuse because the
court in which the contempt is committed imposes the punishment,
usually without intervention by a jury.2 While New York courts
may look to the full range of the common law for civil contempt,
no statutorily undefined, common law criminal contempt power
exists in New York. Therefore, an act which is not a civil contempt
and which is not specifically enumerated among New York's
statutorily defined criminal contempts is not a contempt at all.
The criminal contempt power is necessary to a court's very
existence, yet civil contempt is based on no such necessity. While
the court may level criminal contempt against a contemnor sua
court's order or payment of money to the party that is aggrieved by the witness's
disobedience of the court's order.
22 N.Y. JUD. LAW § 750(A) (McKinney 1993) provides that: "A court of
record has power to punish for criminal contempt a person guilty of any of the
following acts, and no others" (emphasis added); see also N.Y. JUD. LAW
§ 750(C) (McKinney 1993); James v. Powell, 26 A.D.2d 295, 296, 274 N.Y.S.2d
192, 194-95 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 18 N.Y.2d 931, 223 N.E.2d 562, 277 N.Y.S.2d
135 (1966).
23 N.Y. JUD. LAW § 753(A)(8) (McKinney 1993) refers to "any other case
where an attachment or any other proceeding to punish for a contempt has been
usually adopted and practiced in a court of record.. . . "See also People ex rel.
Brewer v. Platzek, 133 A.D. 25, 117 N.Y.S. 852 (1st Dep't 1909).
24 International Union - United Mine Workers of Am., 114 S. Ct. 2552
(1994); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968); Green v. United States, 356 U.S.
165, 187 (1958); Rankin v. Shanker, 23 N.Y.2d 111, 119-20, 242 N.E.2d 802,
806-07, 295 N.Y.S.2d 625, 631-32 (1968).
25 People ex rel. Munsell v. Court of Oyer & Terminer, 101 N.Y. 245, 247-
54, 4 N.E. 259, 259-64 (1886); Gabrelian v. Gabrelian, 108 A.D.2d 445, 448-5 1,
489 N.Y.S.2d 914, 918-20 (2d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 66 N.Y.2d 741, 488
N.E.2d 111,497 N.Y.S.2d 365 (1985); see also Nye v. United States, 313 U.S.
33, 45-48 (1941).
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sponte, or on motion of the people as sovereign, it appears that a
court may invoke civil contempt sanctions only at the insistence of
an aggrieved civil litigant.26 The reason for this distinction is that
a court must be able to vindicate its authority on behalf of public
justice generally, but there is no such imperative for it to, sua
sponte, take over a civil litigation by standing, without invitation,
in the shoes of one of the privately interested civil litigants before
it.
Besides defining and regulating the judiciary's inherent
contempt power, the New York State Legislature enacted Penal
Law criminal contempt in the first and second degree. Any
legislature has the power to make a crime out of that which would
already be a criminal contempt of court as per the court's inherent
powers. 28 Such penal statutes do not actually confer any "con-
tempt power" on the courts, except that after conviction, a court
has the sole authority to sentence. Criminal contempt in the second
degree mirrors much of the Judiciary Law criminal contempt
statute.29 Criminal contempt in the second degree proscribes
"disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior committed during
the sitting of a court, in its immediate view and presence and
directly tending to interrupt its proceedings or impair the respect
due its authority." It also prohibits "intentional disobedience or
resistance to the lawful process or other mandate of a court" or
"contumacious and unlawful refusal to be sworn as a witness in any
court proceeding, or, after being sworn, to answer any legal and
proper interrogatory. 30 Criminal contempt in the first degree
26 Compare United States v. Russotti, 746 F.2d 945, 949-50 (2d Cir. 1984)
with United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 402, 404 (2d Cir. 1977).
27 N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 215.50; 215.51 (McKinney 1993).
28 Munsell, 101 N.Y. at 247-54, 4 N.E. at 259-64.
29 Compare N.Y. JUD. LAW § 750 (McKinney 1993) with N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 215.50.
30 In New York, Penal Law criminal contempt in the second degree is
invocable only by the prosecutor, though it is rarely invoked. See, e.g., People
v. Giglio, 74 A.D.2d 348, 428 N.Y.S.2d 27 (2d Dep't 1980) (defendant
disobeyed court order issued in open court to provide voice exemplars in front
of the jury during his trial for bribery); People v. Virag, 100 A.D.2d 984, 474
N.Y.S.2d 158 (2d Dep't), leave denied, 63 N.Y.2d 713, 469 N.E.2d 117, 480
N.Y.S.2d 1041 (1989) (defendant, husband and wife, convicted of disobeying
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occurs when a witness appears before a grand jury and either
refuses to be sworn or, after having been sworn, refuses to answer
any legal and proper question.3 Second degree criminal contempt
carries up to a year in prison, while first degree criminal contempt
allows for a sentence of up to four years.
Despite its similarity to criminal contempt in the second degree,
Judiciary Law criminal contempt is not a crime. In fact, Judiciary
Law criminal contempt proceedings are neither civil nor crimi-
nal.32 They are sui generis special proceedings to coerce future
obedience or punish past disobedience. 33 U.S. Supreme Court
trial court's written order incorporating and implementing New York Court of
Appeals decision in Virag v. Hynes, 54 N.Y.2d 437, 430 N.E.2d 117, 480
N.Y.S.2d 1041 (1981), which denied their motion to quash a grandjury subpoena
duces tecum).
31 See generally People v. lanniello, 36 N.Y.2d 137, 325 N.E.2d 146, 365
N.Y.S.2d 821, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 831 (1975).
32 The status of judicial criminal contempts has been the subject of ongoing
debate. See Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton, 481 U.S. 787, 798-801
(1987); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 440 (1932); Myers v. United
States, 264 U.S. 95, 103, 104-05 (1924); Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S.
604, 610 (1914) (Justice Holmes claimed that judicial criminal contempts are
crimes); see also Warring v. Huff, 122 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (Chief Judge
Vinson saw no purpose in rehashing the dispute "some of the procedural and
substantive law applied to criminal contempts is as though they were crimes and
some of it is not."). Justice Holmes' viewpoint, which courts, seeking a desired
result, often seized upon unnecessarily or deliberately, is not supported by earlier
or later Supreme Courts. Cf United States v. Greene, 241 F.2d 631, 633 (2d Cir.
1957) (Judge Learned Hand labelled Justice Holmes' claim the product of
confusion). But see United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993) (for double
jeopardy purposes, judiciary criminal contempt is a crime "in the ordinary sense";
International Union - United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 114 S. Ct. 2552
(1994) ("Serious criminal contempt fines [are] ... crimes in the ordinary
sense.").
33 Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 47-48 (1941); Blackmer, 284 U.S. at
440; Myers, 264 U.S. at 103; Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S.
418 (1911); Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 327 (1904); Ex parte
Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 303, 307-09 (1888); Exparte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 302-03
(1883) (Field, J., dissenting); Gabrelian v. Gabrelian, 108 A.D.2d 445, 448-5 1,
489 N.Y.S.2d 914, 918-21 (2d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 66 N.Y.2d 741, 488
N.E.2d 111,497 N.Y.S.2d 365 (1985); City Sch. Dist. v. SchenectadyFed'n of
Teachers, 49 A.D.2d 395, 399, 375 N.Y.S.2d 179, 183-84 (3d Dep't 1975);
People ex rel. Frank v. McCann, 227 A.D. 57, 58, 237 N.Y.S. 85, 87-88, aff'd,
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decisions construing and harmonizing the judicial contempt power
with double jeopardy, petty offense and modern day conceptions of
due process have not metamorphosed it into a crime.34 Moreover,
the procedural protections which have come to surround the
imposition of punishment for judicial criminal contempt are merely
accretions of fundamental fairness rather than applications of the
Bill of Rights to contempt prosecutions as crimes.35
II. CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE GRAND JURY WITNESS
When a grand jury witness refuses to answer questions or
produce evidence by asserting a timely legal objection, a prosecutor
must obtain a court order commanding the witness to do so prior
to seeking sanctions under the Judiciary or Penal Laws. Flat refusal
to answer, evasive nonanswer, or simple disobedience of the grand
jury's subpoena entail no such requirement. In this situation, the
prosecutor may either directly proceed under the Penal Law by
indictment or seek a court order with a view toward sanctions
under the Judiciary Law to command the witness's obedience. This
extra optional step in the face of naked disobedience is often
employed in long-term grand jury investigations. Judiciary Law
sanctions are much quicker than criminal prosecution and may
improve the attitude of a contemnor upon returning from jail to the
grand jury, as well as that of others who may profit from the
contemnor's example. Alternatively, the prosecutor could seek a
more drastic measure by proceeding immediately under the Penal
Law and asking the grand jury to return an indictment charging a
witness with the Class E felony of criminal contempt in the first
253 N.Y. 221, 224, 170 N.E. 898, 898 (1930).
14 Colombo v. New York, 405 U.S. 9 (1972); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S.
194 (1968); Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 183-87 (1958); Gompers v.
United States, 233 U.S. 604 (1914).
35 Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton, 481 U.S. 787, 799-800 (1987);
Blackmer, 284 U.S. at 440; United States v. Bukowski, 435 F.2d 1094, 1101 (7th
Cir. 1970); accord Sassower v. Sheriff of Westchester County, 824 F.2d 184,
188-89 (2d Cir. 1987). See generally Hanbury v. Benedict, 160 A.D. 662, 146
N.Y.S.2d 44 (2d Dep't 1914).
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degree36 for refusal to answer or evasive nonanswer. The prosecu-
tor could also seek an indictment for the Class A misdemeanor of
criminal contempt in the second degree17 for disobeying the grand
jury process by simple failure to appear or produce documents
before it.38
Whether a recalcitrant grand jury witness must or may be
brought before the court,3 9 the scope of the proceeding is quite
limited. After determining the relevancy, legality and propriety of
questions rebuffed or evaded, or physical evidence refused, a court
will either order or excuse compliance.4 ° Should recalcitrance
36 This statute was specifically drawn with those in mind who, appearing as
a witness before a grand jury, "contumaciously and unlawfully refuse[] to be
sworn as a witness ... or ... having been sworn as a witness ... refuse[] to
answer any legal and proper interrogatory." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.51.
37 This statute was enacted with those in mind who, appearing as a witness
before a grand jury, "intentionally disobey the lawful mandate of a court." N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 215.50. A grand jury subpoena is a mandate of the court. See
infra note 87 and accompanying text.
38 To the extent that a grand jury subpoena seeks testimony, the litigation
must wait until the witness actually hears and refuses a question. With a grand
jury subpoena duces tecum, however, a different situation prevails. Purportedly
privileged documents would have to be revealed before a court could intervene.
Consequently, a subpoena duces tecum must be attacked by a motion to quash
before the return date in order to force the matter into court. Beach v. Shanley,
62 N.Y.2d 241, 247-48, 465 N.E.2d 304, 306-07, 476 N.Y.S.2d 765, 767-68
(1984); see also People v. Desmond, 98 A.D.2d 728, 729, 469 N.Y.S.2d 141,
142 (2d Dep't 1983).
'9 It is a "must" situation if the witness asserts a privilege against answering,
People v. lanniello, 21 N.Y.2d 418, 235 N.E.2d 439, 288 N.Y.S.2d 462 (1968),
or if the prosecutor wants the court to impose contempt sanctions under the
Judiciary Law, People v. Leone, 44 N.Y.2d 315, 376 N.E.2d 1287, 405 N.Y.S.2d
642 (1978); Koota v. Colombo, 17 N.Y.2d 147, 216 N.E.2d 568, 269 N.Y.S.2d
393, cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1001 (1966).
40 See generally Additional Jan. 1979 Grand Jury v. Doe, 50 N.Y.2d 14, 405
N.E.2d 194, 427 N.Y.S.2d 950 (1980); Virag v. Hynes, 54 N.Y.2d 437, 430
N.E.2d 1249, 446 N.Y.S.2d 196 (1981); People v. Rappaport, 47 N.Y.2d 308,
391 N.E.2d 1284, 418 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1979); Keenan v. Gigante, 47 N.Y.2d 160,
390 N.E.2d 1151, 417 N.Y.S.2d 226 (1979); People v. Leone, 44 N.Y.2d 315,
318, 376 N.E.2d 1287, 1288, 405 N.Y.S.2d 642, 643 (1978); Gold v. Menna, 25
N.Y.2d 475, 255 N.E.2d 235, 307 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1969); Koota 17 N.Y.2d at 151,
216 N.E.2d at 569-70, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 395-96; Second Additional Grand Jury
v. Cirillo, 12 N.Y.2d 206, 188 N.E.2d 138, 237 N.Y.S.2d 709 (1963); People ex
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persist, the witness has not only committed the crime of contempt
but has also disobeyed a court mandate. Consequently, Penal or
Judiciary Law sanctions may follow as appropriate to the circum-
stances. For Penal Law sanctions, the prosecution need only submit
evidence of the contemnor's disobedience to a grand jury. For
Judiciary Law sanctions, the prosecution may bring the matter on
a simple order to show cause. A grand jury witness who asserts an
objection or privilege must clearly and continuously maintain the
same until vindicated or overruled by the court. By forcing the
prosecutor to take the matter into open court, "the [grand jury]
proceeding is expedited and the danger of stalling tactics re-
duced."'" Flat refusals to answer or produce evidence, however,
are exceedingly hazardous for the witness.42 Legal grounds not
raised before the grand jury are unavailable as later defenses to
Judiciary or Penal Law criminal contempt. They are deemed
waived.43 Evasive nonanswers are likewise simply refusals to
answer44 no prior court order is necessary for an indictment.
rel. Cirillo v. Warden of the City Prison, 11 N.Y.2d 51, 181 N.E.2d 424, 226
N.Y.S.2d 398 (1962).
41 lanniello, 21 N.Y.2d at 425, 235 N.E.2d at 444, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 469.
42 People v. Roseman, N.Y.L.J., July 7, 1978, p.7 col.6 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 78
A.D.2d 878, leave denied, 53 N.Y.2d 845, 422 N.E.2d 843, 440 N.Y.S.2d 1037
(1981); People v. Paperno, 98 Misc.2d 99, 104, 413 N.Y.S.2d 975, 980-81 (Sup.
Ct. 1979), rev'don other grounds, 77 A.D.2d 137, 432 N.Y.S.2d 499 (2d Dep't
1980), rev'd, 54 N.Y.2d 294, 445 N.Y.S.2d 119, 429 N.E.2d 797 (1981).
43 People v. DeSalvo, 32 N.Y.2d 12, 14,295 N.E.2d 750,751,343 N.Y.S.2d
65, 66-67 (1973); People v. Gentile, 47 A.D.2d 930, 367 N.Y.S.2d 69 (2d Dep't
1975), aff'd, 39 N.Y.2d 779, 350 N.E.2d 615, 385 N.Y.S.2d 284 (1976).
44 People v. McGrath, 46 N.Y.2d 12, 29, 385 N.E.2d 541, 549, 412
N.Y.S.2d 801, 809-10 (1978); People v. Schenkman, 46 N.Y.2d 232, 237, 385
N.E.2d 1214, 1216, 413 N.Y.S.2d 284, 286-87 (1978); People v. lanniello, 36
N.Y.2d 137, 142, 325 N.E.2d 146, 148, 365 N.Y.S.2d 821, 824 (1975); DeSalvo,
32 N.Y.2d at 16-17, 295 N.E.2d at 752-53, 343 N.Y.S.2d at 67-69; lanniello, 21
N.Y.2d at 426, 235 N.E.2d at 444, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 469-70; People v.
Lombardozzi, 73 A.D.2d 659, 423 N.Y.S.2d 225 (2d Dep't 1979); People v.
McGrath, 86 Misc.2d 249, 257, 380 N.Y.S.2d 976, 984-85 (Sup. Ct. 1976),
rev'd, 57 A.D.2d 405, 394 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1st Dep't 1977), rev'd and conviction
reinstated, 46 N.Y.2d 12, 385 N.E.2d 541, 412 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1978).
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The uncooperative witness has no legally cognizable expectation
that the prosecutor will elect to proceed under the Judiciary Law
rather than Penal Law.45 If privilege or objection is timely
asserted, then overruled, and followed by disobedience, the same
alternate consequences may follow. But the witness's claim of
privilege or objection will have been preserved. Should it be later
sustained by pretrial motion or on appeal, such privilege or
objection will constitute an absolute defense. A witness can
establish a defense at a contempt proceeding or trial by way of
confession and avoidance or the court can hold that questions
refused by the witness are not legal and proper or have lost potency
as contempt predicates.46
A. Mens Rea of Testimonial Contempt
Penal Law criminal contempt in the first and second degree and
Judiciary Law criminal contempt47 speak solely in terms of an
intentional refusal to answer legal and proper questions. Yet, the
judiciary has used language such as "willfulness" and "tending to
41 People v. Rappaport, 47 N.Y.2d 308, 314, 391 N.E.2d 1284, 1287-88, 418
N.Y.S.2d 306, 308-10 (1979); People v. Buonoraba, 27 N.Y.2d 604, 261 N.E.2d
411, 313 N.Y.S.2d 413 (1970); People v. Ruggiano, 39 A.D.2d 113, 113-14, 332
N.Y.S.2d 458, 459-60 (2d Dep't 1972); Paperno, 98 Misc.2d at 105, 413
N.Y.S.2d at 981-82.
46 Keenan v. Gigante, 47 N.Y.2d 160, 390 N.E.2d 1151, 417 N.Y.S.2d 226
(1979); McGrath, 46 N.Y.2d at 29-30, 385 N.E.2d at 548-49, 412 N.Y.S.2d at
810; Santangello v. People, 38 N.Y.2d 536, 540, 344 N.E.2d 404, 406, 381
N.Y.S.2d 472, 472-74 (1976); lanniello, 36 N.Y.2d at 140, 325 N.E.2d at 147,
365 N.Y.S.2d at 822-23; DeSalvo, 32 N.Y.2d at 16-17, 295 N.E.2d at 752-53,
343 N.Y.S.2d at 68-69; Gold v. Menna, 25 N.Y.2d 475, 255 N.E.2d 235, 307
N.Y.S.2d 33 (1969); lanniello, 21 N.Y.2d 418, 235 N.E.2d 439, 288 N.Y.S.2d
462; Koota v. Colombo, 17 N.Y.2d 147, 216 N.E.2d 568, 269 N.Y.S.2d 393,
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1001 (1966); Grand Jury v. Cioffi, 8 N.Y.2d 220, 168
N.E.2d 663, 203 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1960); Spector v. Allen, 281 N.Y. 251, 22
N.E.2d 360 (1939); People v. De Martino, 71 A.D.2d 477,483-84,422 N.Y.S.2d
949, 954-55 (1st Dep't 1979).
47 N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 215.50(1), 215.51, 15.15(2) (McKinney 1992); N.Y.
JUD. LAW § 750(A)(5) (McKinney 1992).
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obstruct" to define testimonial criminal contempt's mens rea.48
Therefore, "willfulness" and "tending to obstruct" are legal
surplusage.49 A "sincerely" contemptuous witness who stubbornly
refuses to answer, flatly or on meritless and overruled legal
grounds, may not have the slightest desire to willfully tend to
obstruct a legal proceeding. Nevertheless, a witness's knowing
intent to simply refuse to answer"° is sufficient to prove guilt of
contempt.5
Testimonial criminal contempt, of whatever statutory stripe, is
simply an intentional refusal to answer legal and proper ques-
tions.5 2 Advice of counsel is no defense. Fear for one's safety or
that of one's child, not rising to the level of legal duress, is no
48 See, e.g., People ex rel. Munsell v. Court of Oyer & Terminer, 101
N.Y.2d 245, 248-49, 4 N.E. 259, 260 (1886); People v. Dercole, 72 A.D.2d 318,
334, 424 N.Y.S.2d 459, 469-70 (2d Dep't 1980); People v. Giglio, 74 A.D.2d
348, 353-54, 428 N.Y.S.2d 27, 30-31 (2d Dep't 1980); People v. Gorgone, 47
A.D.2d 347, 351, 366 N.Y.S.2d 647, 650-51 (1st Dep't 1975); People ex reL
Valenti v. McCloskey, 8 A.D.2d 74, 80, 185 N.Y.S.2d 952, 959 (1st Dep't),
rev'd, 6 N.Y.2d 390, 160 N.E.2d 647, 189 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1959); Steingut v.
Imrie, 270 A.D. 34, 48, 58 N.Y.S.2d 775, 778 (3d Dep't 1945); Finkel v.
McCook, 247 A.D. 57, 63, 286 N.Y.S. 755, 761-62 (1st Dep't 1936); Paperno,
98 Misc.2d at 104, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 981.
49 See People v. Schenkman, 46 N.Y.2d 232, 237, 385 N.E.2d 1214, 1216-
17, 413 N.Y.S.2d 284, 286-87 (1978); People v. Martin, 42 N.Y.2d 882, 883,
367 N.E.2d 881, 881, 397 N.Y.S.2d 794, 794 (1977); People v. Tantleff, 40
N.Y.2d 862, 863, 356 N.E.2d 477,477, 387 N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1005 (1976); People
v. Martin, 47 A.D.2d 883, 884, 367 N.Y.S.2d 8, 9-10 (Ist Dep't 1975); People
v. Renaghan, 40 A.D.2d 150, 152, 338 N.Y.S.2d 125, 127-28 (1st Dep't 1972).
50 Keenan v. Gigante, 47 N.Y.2d 160, 390 N.E.2d 1151, 417 N.Y.S.2d 226
(1979); People v. McGrath, 46 N.Y.2d 12, 29, 385 N.E.2d 541, 549, 412
N.Y.S.2d 801, 809-10 (1979); Second Additional Grand Jury v. Cioffi, 8 N.Y.2d
220, 168 N.E.2d 663, 203 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1960); DiBiasi v. Schweitzer, 22
A.D.2d 684, 253 N.Y.S.2d 425 (1st Dep't 1964).
"1 People v. Breindel, 73 Misc.2d 734, 737-38, 342 N.Y.S.2d 428, 431-33,
(Sup. Ct. 1973), aff'd, 45 A.D.2d 691, 356 N.Y.S.2d 626 (1st Dep't 1974), aff'd,
35 N.Y.2d 928, 324 N.E.2d 545, 365 N.Y.S.2d 163 (1974).
52 People v. lanniello, 36 N.Y.2d 137, 325 N.E.2d 146, 365 N.Y.S.2d 821
(1975); Ruskin v. Detken, 32 N.Y.2d 293, 297, 298 N.E.2d 101, 103-04, 344
N.Y.S.2d 933, 935-36 (1973); see also Zicarelli v. New Jersey, 406 U.S. 470,
476-77 (1972).
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defense.53 Sincere religious beliefs or the concern of one spouse for
another do not negate an intentional refusal to answer.54
In contrast to Penal Law contempt, neither Judiciary Law
section 750(A)(3), nor the cases construing it, define "willfulness."
In dicta, the Court of Appeals has stated that "the element which
serves to elevate a contempt from civil to criminal is the level of
willfulness with which the conduct is carried out."'55 How can one
be more or less willful than willful? As a rule-of-thumb expression,
"level of willfulness" is uninformative. Viewed as a roughly stated
burden of proof for Judiciary Law criminal contempt, it is
superfluous to the required standard of "beyond a reasonable
doubt."56 Statements such as "[i]n the absence of a specification
that the contempt was criminal and without a finding of willful
disobedience, the alleged contempt must be considered. . . civil
5 7
are similarly uninformative. Judiciary Law civil contempt requires
"reasonable certainty. '58 A lower "level of willfulness" appears no
more at home with "reasonable certainty" than with "beyond a
reasonable doubt."
" Piemonte v. United States, 367 U.S. 556, 559 n.2 (1961); Simkin v.
United States, 715 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1983); People v. Clinton, 42 A.D.2d 815,
815-16, 346 N.Y.S.2d 345, 346-47 (3d Dep't 1973); People v. Gumbs, 124
Misc.2d 564, 478 N.Y.S.2d 513 (Sup. Ct. 1984).
" Smilow v. United States, 465 F.2d 802 (2d Cir.), vacated on other
grounds, 409 U.S. 944 (1972); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 776 F.2d 1099,
1102-04 (2d Cir. 1985); People v. Woodruff, 26 A.D.2d 236, 272 N.Y.S.2d 786
(2d Dep't 1966), aff'd, 21 N.Y.2d 848, 236 N.E.2d 159, 288 N.Y.S.2d 1004
(1968); In re Fuhrer, 100 Misc.2d 315, 419 N.Y.S.2d 426 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd on
opinion below, 72 A.D.2d 813, 421 N.Y.S.2d 906 (2d Dep't 1979).
" McCormick v. Axelrod, 59 N.Y.2d 574, 583, 453 N.E.2d 508, 512, 466
N.Y.S.2d 279, 283, amended, 60 N.Y.2d 652, 454 N.E.2d 1314, 467 N.Y.S.2d
571 (1983).
56 County of Rockland v. Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n, Inc., 62 N.Y.2d 11,
14, 464 N.E.2d 121, 122, 475 N.Y.S.2d 817, 818 (1984).
" Sentry Corp. v. New York City Off-Track Betting, 75 A.D.2d 344, 345,
429 N.Y.S.2d 902, 903 (1st Dep't 1980).
's McCormick, 59 N.Y.2d at 582, 453 N.E.2d at 512, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 283;
N.A. Dev. Co., Ltd. v. Jones, 99 A.D.2d 238, 242, 472 N.Y.S.2d 363, 366-67
(1st Dep't 1984).
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"Willfulness" need mean no more than knowing and intentional
as determined in federal cases.59 Criminal contempt in the second
degree,6 ° inter alia, uses the words "intentional" and "knowingly"
and mirrors the Judiciary Law's criminal contempt statute61 in
most other material respects. "Knowing" and "intentional," under
contemporary standards of due process, seem to be as good a
definition of "willfulness" as any. The phrase "level of willfulness"
would best be laid to rest.
B. Testimonial Evasive Contempt
Criminal contempt by evasive testimony, no matter how
sanctioned, has numerous judicial definitions which are distinct,
similar and sometimes contradictory.62 Capturing the cumulative
essence of these definitions would merely add another definitional
shade to the word "evasive." Essentially, definitions of evasive
testimonial contempt describe a crime of the intellect to be
apprehended only by other intellects. The trick is to give meaning-
ful factual content to whatever definition the court selects in a
given case.
The distinction between evasive testimonial contempt and
perjury is sometimes obscured. Every falsehood is an evasion, and
" United States v. Armstrong, 781 F.2d 700, 706 (9th Cir. 1985); see also
United States v. Nightingale, 703 F.2d 17, 18-19 (1st Cir. 1983); Goldfine v.
United States, 268 F.2d 941, 945 (1st Cir. 1959).
60 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.50.
6' N.Y. JUD. LAW § 750.
62 People v. Gottfried, 61 N.Y.2d 617, 619, 459 N.E.2d 1281, 1281, 471
N.Y.S.2d 844, 844 (1983); People v. Amette, 58 N.Y.2d 1104, 1106, 449 N.E.2d
711, 712, 462 N.Y.S.2d 817, 818 (1983); People v. Schenkman, 46 N.Y.2d 232,
237, 385 N.E.2d 1214, 1216-17, 413 N.Y.S.2d 284, 286-87 (1978); People v.
lanniello, 36 N.Y.2d 137, 142, 325 N.E.2d 146, 147, 365 N.Y.S.2d 821, 824
(1975); People v. Renaghan, 33 N.Y.2d 991, 992, 309 N.E.2d 425, 425, 453
N.Y.S.2d 962, 963 (1974) (Brietel, J., dissenting); People v. Saperstein, 2 N.Y.2d
210, 216-17, 140 N.E.2d 252, 255-56, 159 N.Y.S.2d 160, 164-66 (1957); In re
Investigation by the Regular Grand Jury, 278 A.D. 206, 212-13, 104 N.Y.S. 414,
420-21 (2d Dep't 1951); Steingut v. Imrie, 270 A.D. 34, 48, 558 N.Y.S.2d 775,
779 (3d Dep't 1945); Finkel v. McCook, 247 A.D. 57, 62, 286 N.Y.S.2d 755,
759-60 (1st Dep't 1936).
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every evasion, by necessity, amounts to some degree of false-
hood.63 Is there a type or degree of falsehood amounting to a
refusal to answer? Are there types of evasive testimony which are
also perjurious? An answer such as, "How now brown cow" is
obviously a nonanswer. "I can't remember whether I've been
married more than a week," by contrast, is evasive and, absent
perpetual insobriety or insanity, perjurious.
In New York, an indictment charging perjury and contempt for
the same answer is entirely proper. In addition, there are types of
egregiously and conspicuously perjurious answers which may
subject the witness to Judiciary Law contempt sanctions because
these "answers" are no answers at all. They are deemed nonanswers
if they suggest not the slightest possibility of truthfulness, present
no credibility issue and actually obstruct the proceedings in which
they are given.64 If the law has any power at all, it has the power
to deal summarily with a sham, untruthful answer intended to fob
off inquiry.
C. Proof of Criminal Contempt by Evasive Testimony
Proof of criminal contempt "stands or fails on the basis of the
record of testimony, without regard to collateral proof., 65 Some-
times the transcript must be redacted to exclude unwarrantedly
63 People ex rel. Valenti v. McCloskey, 8 A.D.2d 74, 78, 185 N.Y.S.2d 952,
956 rev'don other grounds, 6 N.Y.2d 390, 160 N.E.2d 647, 189 N.Y.S.2d 898
(1959).
64 Ruskin v. Detken, 32 N.Y.2d 293, 297, 298 N.E.2d 101, 103-04, 344
N.Y.S.2d 933, 935-36 (1973); Valenti, 8 A.D.2d at 74, 185 N.Y.S.2d at 952;
Finkel, 247 A.D. at 62-63, 286 N.Y.S. at 762 ; see also Ex parte Hudgings, 249
U.S. 378, 383 (1919); Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 12 (1933); In re
Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 228 (1945); United States v. McGovern, 60 F.2d 880,
889 (2d Cir. 1932); United States v. Appel, 211 F. 495, 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
65 People v. Roseman, N.Y.L.J., July 7, 1978, at 7 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 78
A.D.2d 878, 433 N.Y.S.2d 25 (1st Dep't 1980); People v. Hirsch, N.Y.L.J., Feb.
13, 1979, at 12 (Sup. Ct.); People v. Paperno, 98 Misc.2d 99, 103, 413 N.Y.S.2d
975, 981 (Sup. Ct. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 77 A.D.2d 137, 432 N.Y.S.2d
499 (1st Dep't 1980), rev'd, 54 N.Y.2d 294, 429 N.E.2d 797, 445 N.Y.S.2d 119
(1981); People v. Knyper, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 5, 1978, at 5 (Sup. Ct.); People v.
Marinaccio, 90 Misc.2d 128, 130, 393 N.Y.S.2d 904, 906 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
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prejudicial matters. But where evasiveness takes the form of a
feigned inability to recall, the entire transcript may be admissible
(with prejudicial, but probative matters) to demonstrate an
otherwise precise memory.66
New York Court of Appeals dictum has brought some confusion
into the law about proving criminal contempt. In affirming a
contempt conviction based on feigned lack of recollection, the court
reaffirmed the principle that contempt "is not grounded... on the
truth or falsity of the answer," but rather on the premise that the
answer "is no answer at all and ... thus tantamount to a refusal to
answer."67 This in mind, the court held it "unnecessary" to
determine whether the event assumed by the inquiry actually did or
did not occur. However, the court added a footnote: "We do not
suggest that evidence that the event ... did occur would be
inadmissible if offered by the People, or that evidence that it did
not occur would be inadmissible if offered on behalf of the
defendant. 
68
The footnote seems ill-considered for several reasons. First, the
footnote is logically inconsistent with the rule enunciated in its
parent text. If contempt is not to be founded on the truth or falsity
of an answer's content, but on whether the answer is an answer at
all, proof of whether the underlying event in fact transpired is
totally irrelevant. Second, the footnote obscures the fundamental
distinction between perjury69 and contempt.7" Third, where an
indictment charges contempt through feigned lack of recollection,
66 See Gottfried, 61 N.Y.2d at 620, 459 N.E.2d at 1282, 471 N.Y.S.2d at
845. Compare People v. McGrath, 57 A.D.2d 405, 413, 394 N.Y.S.2d 885, 890
(1st Dep't 1977), rev'don other grounds, 46 N.Y.2d 12, 385 N.E.2d 541, 412
N.Y.S.2d 801 (1978) with People v. Saperstein, 2 N.Y.2d 210, 216-17, 140
N.E.2d 252, 255-56, 159 N.Y.S.2d 160, 164-65 (1957).
67 People v. Fischer, 53 N.Y.2d 178, 184, 423 N.E.2d 349, 351, 440
N.Y.S.2d 872, 874 (1981).
61 Fisher, 53 N.Y.2d at 184 n.3, 423 N.E.2d at 352 n.3, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 875
n.3.
69 Perjury is defined as a "false statement knowingly made ... as to some
matter material to the issue or point in question." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1139 (6th ed. 1990).
70 Contempt is defined as a "willful disregard or disobedience of a public
authority." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 318 (6th ed. 1990).
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evidence that the underlying event did or did not occur proves that
the evasive nonanswer was a lie (perjury), a crime not charged in
the indictment. Fourth, assuming that the underlying event did or
did not in fact occur, the exclusive question still remains whether
the lack of recollection of such event or nonevent was feigned
(contempt) or genuine (innocence). Fifth, the court's footnote is
contradictory of its parent text insofar as it posits that evidence
regarding the underlying event is admissible but "unnecessary." In
law, the "unnecessary" smacks of the irrelevant and immaterial.
One federal court has held that a Sixth Amendment claim (right to
summon witnesses) based on reasoning similar to that contained in
the court's footnote to be "not only without substance but [border-
ing] on the specious."'"
The court's footnote may be harmonized with logic and rules
of evidence only if confined to indictments charging both contempt
and perjury for the same answer. A witness who states, "I don't
recall" when he or she does recall, is lying and is being evasively
contemptuous. Proof concerning the occurrence of the event which
is the subject of inquiry, one way or the other, would clearly be
admissible on the perjury count, with neither policy nor logic
proscribing a guilty verdict for either perjury or contempt or
both.72
D. Admonishing an Evasively Contemptuous Grand Jury
Witness
A prosecutor confronted by an evasive grand jury witness once
faced a potentially "no win" situation. Warning the witness about
contempt risked an accusation that the witness was unfairly
prejudiced before the grand jury, which ultimately indicted him for
contempt. Doing nothing invited a claim that the witness was
71 Stahl v. New York, 520 F. Supp. 221, 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (emphasis
added).
72 People v. Gottfried, 61 N.Y.2d 617, 459 N.E.2d 1281, 471 N.Y.S.2d 844
(1983); People v. Schenkman, 46 N.Y.2d 232, 385 N.E.2d 1214, 413 N.Y.S.2d
284 (1978); People v. Hirsch, 83 A.D.2d 811, 441 N.Y.S.2d 811 (1st Dep't
1981).
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wrongfully lulled into believing that his or her answers were
responsive.
73
This dilemma has been resolved. First, a prosecutor must,
plainly and correctly, inform witnesses of the scope of their
immunity from criminal prosecution.74 Second, the prosecutor
should also advise the witnesses that their immunity will not shield
them from perjury or contempt. 75 Third, while not required to do
so, a prosecutor, where appropriate, may repeat questions evaded.
Fourth, the prosecutor may remind and admonish evasive witnesses
about the perils of contempt (and perjury) in a good faith effort to
encourage responsiveness. This final option, however, is not a
license to prejudice a grand jury against a witness by registering
disappointment with otherwise responsive answers under the guise
of admonishment.76
"3 Compare People v. Cutrone, 50 A.D.2d 838, 376 N.Y.S.2d 593 (2d Dep't
1975) with People v. Didio, 60 A.D.2d 978, 978-79, 401 N.Y.S.2d 640, 640-42
(4th Dep't 1978).
74 People v. Masiello, 28 N.Y.2d 287, 270 N.E.2d 305, 321 N.Y.S.2d 577
(1971); see, e.g., Stevens v. Marks, 383 U.S. 234, 246 (1966) (holding that a
"witness has . . . a constitutional right to stand on the privilege against self-
incrimination until it has been fairly demonstrated to him that an immunity, as
broad in scope as the privilege it replaces, is available and applicable to him.");
People v. Tramunti, 29 N.Y.2d 28, 29, 272 N.E.2d 66, 67, 323 N.Y.S.2d 687,
688 (1971) (stating that the prosecutor's immunity advice was almost unintelligi-
ble); see also People v. Mulligan, 29 N.Y.2d 20, 27 N.E.2d 62, 323 N.Y.S.2d
681 (1971); People v. Sparaco, 39 A.D.2d 753, 332 N.Y.S.2d 351 (2d Dep't
1972) (Shapiro, J., dissenting), aff'd, 32 N.Y.2d 652, 295 N.E.2d 653, 342
N.Y.S.2d 854 (1973).
71 People v. Rappaport, 47 N.Y.2d 308, 313-14, 391 N.E.2d 1284, 1287-88,
418 N.Y.S.2d 306, 308-10 (1979).
76 People v. Rappaport, 60 A.D.2d 565, 565-66, 400 N.Y.S.2d 351, 352 (1st
Dep't 1977), aff'd, 47 N.Y.2d 308, 391 N.E.2d 1284, 418 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1979);
People v. Roseman, N.Y.L.J., July 7, 1978, at 7 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 78 A.D.2d 878,
433 N.Y.S.2d 25 (1st Dep't 1980); People v. Hirsch, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 13, 1979, at
12 (Sup. Ct.); People v. Knyper, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 5, 1978, at 5 (Sup. Ct.); see also
People v. Davis, 53 N.Y.2d 164, 423 N.E.2d 341, 440 N.Y.S.2d 864 (1981);
People v. Pomerantz, 46 N.Y.2d 240, 385 N.E.2d 1218, 413 N.Y.S.2d 288
(1978); People v. Tyler, 46 N.Y.2d 251, 385 N.E.2d 1224, 413 N.Y.S.2d 295
(1978); Schenkman, 46 N.Y.2d at 232, 385 N.E.2d at 1214, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 284.
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E. News Media as Grand Jury Witnesses
In New York, the news media and the grand jury present a
special problem because the state legislature has granted
unwarranted, special treatment to journalists. Be it ever so
legislated, there is no privilege like a reporter's to snoop, scoop and
"clam up." By either privilege or exemption, New York's Civil
Rights Law has precluded the use of the contempt sanction against
journalists who refuse to divulge their sources to grand and petit
juries." Does this "shield law" tread on the separation of powers
doctrine in that it removes from the judiciary the power to enforce
orders necessary to its conduct of grand and petit jury proceedings?
Is a Court of Appeals decision holding that the shield law does not
impair or suspend the state constitutional power of grand juries to
investigate misconduct in public office the product of reasoned
analysis or judicial ipse dixit impelled by hydraulic forces of the
moment? May it at some point interfere with the governor's state
constitutional duty to take care that the laws are faithfully
executed?7" Does the shield law become an intolerable luxury
when a reporter withholds vital inculpatory or exculpatory evidence
in a murder case? Regarding the crime of unlawful grand jury
disclosure, does the shield law not only protect the corrupt reporter
but also confer de facto immunity on a prosecutor turned divulging
felon? In short, does the shield law place certain people aside if not
7 N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(b) (McKinney 1993).
78 N.Y. CONST. Art. I § 4; Art. IV § 3; Knight-Ridder Broadcasting, Inc. v.
Greenberg, 70 N.Y.2d 151, 511 N.E.2d 116, 518 N.Y.S.2d 595 (1987); Beach
v. Shanley, 62 N.Y.2d 241, 465 N.E.2d 304, 476 N.Y.S.2d 765 (1984); Oak
Beach Inn v. Babylon Beacon, 62 N.Y.2d 158, 164-66, 464 N.E.2d 967, 969-70,
476 N.Y.S.2d 269, 271-72(1984); see also Stem v. Morgenthau, 62 N.Y.2d 331,
335, 465 N.E.2d 349, 350-51, 476 N.Y.S.2d 810, 811-12 (1984) (dicta); Sharon
v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538, 582-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). See generally O'Neill
v. Oakgrove Constr., Inc., 71 N.Y.2d 521, 523 N.E.2d 277, 528 N.Y.S.2d 1
(1988); cf Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 632 (1972) (unanimously cited with
approval in University of Pa. v. E.E.O.C., 493 U.S. 182, 190-200 (1990));
United States v. Cutler, 6 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1993) (Supreme Court and Second
Circuit largely rejected the rationales offered by the press and legislators in
support of New York's Shield Law).
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above the law and its right to everyone's evidence? The courts,
legislature and the bar are still struggling with these questions. This
author strongly believes that there are "babies in the bath water" of
Civil Rights Law section 79-h(b), shrill arguments of the "First
Amendment lobby" to the contrary notwithstanding. Time will
tell.79
III. PUNISHING CONTEMPT
A clear, communicated court order is the indispensable
predicate for virtually all Judiciary and Penal Law contempts. One
cannot be held in contempt for disobeying an uncommunicated or
vague court order (or grand or trial jury subpoena issued by a
prosecutor, which is also considered a court mandate). However,
court orders generally need not take any special physical form or
mode of delivery."0 Although formal service of a court order may
emphasize expected obedience, knowledge of the order, however
'9 Newly enacted Civil Rights Law §§ 79-h(c)-(g) also shields nonconfiden-
tial sources-a possible infringement of a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights.
See, e.g., LAWRENCE N. GRAY, THE GRAND JURY [N NEW YORK (1994):
Consider the following wild hypothetical: A newspaper reporter is
walking down Fifth Avenue and sees a Court of Appeals Judge's
son-now a famous defense attorney-shot to death. He clearly saw
the gunman and will not forget his face as long as he lives. Being
eager for promotion, his 17-column exclusive story is on the network
news and the newsstands within an hour. The murderer is so impressed
that he begins to confidentially phone the reporter with the "whys" and
"wherefores" of his nefarious deed, part of which was the victim's
expected alibi testimony in a murder case presently on trial where this
murderer, not the defendant in the dock, is the true culprit. Can the law
make the reporter talk or has Civil Rights Law § 79 h(b)-(g) become
misprision of felony?
'0 International Longshoreman's Ass'n v. Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n,
389 U.S. 64, 76 (1976); Daly v. Amberg, 126 N.Y. 490, 494, 495-96, 27 N.E.
1038, 1039-40 (1891); Holtzman v. Beatty, 97 A.D.2d 79, 468 N.Y.S.2d 905 (2d
Dep't 1983); see also Pereira v. Pereira, 35 N.Y.2d 301, 308, 319 N.E.2d 413,
417-18, 361 N.Y.S.2d 148, 153-54 (1974); In re Wilson, 98 A.D.2d 666, 469
N.Y.S.2d 735 (Ist Dep't 1983); Puro v. Puro, 39 A.D.2d 873, 333 N.Y.S.2d 560
(1st Dep't 1972), aff'd, 33 N.Y.2d 805, 305 N.E.2d 778, 350 N.Y.S.2d 658
(1973); Martin v. Raffin, 2 Misc. 588 (N.Y.C. Mun. Ct. 1893).
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obtained, is dispositive.8" Therefore, once a court order is commu-
nicated, the contemnor must either stay the order or obey it.
Four caveats about responding to court orders are appropriate
here. First, if knowledge of a court's order is initially imparted to
an intermediary, that person must either remain silent or counsel
obedience, for one who aids or advises disobedience is as guilty as
one who actually disobeys.8 2 Second, a court's order endures
through the appellate process, though its enforcement may be
stayed.13 Third, absent a stay pending appeal, all court orders not
void on their face (e.g., "go kill someone") must be promptly
obeyed, even if they are later ruled incorrect. Judgmental error in
failing to obtain a stay or "good faith disobedience" is not a
defense to a contempt citation or conviction.84 Fourth, a motion
relating to, or an appeal from, a contempt citation or conviction
may not be used to revive a challenge to an order which was never
stayed or challenged ab initios5
8" Generally, this knowledge must be personal, not imputed. McCormick v.
Axelrod, 59 N.Y.2d 574, 583, 453 N.E.2d 508, 513, 466 N.Y.S.2d 279, 283,
amended, 60 N.Y.2d 652, 454 N.E.2d 1314, 467 N.Y.S.2d 571 (1983); In re
Kaplan, 8 N.Y.2d 214, 219-20, 168 N.E.2d 660, 662, 203 N.Y.S.2d 836, 839-40
(1960); Spector v. Allen, 281 N.Y. 251, 258, 22 N.E.2d 360, 363-64 (1939);
People ex rel. Drake v. Andrews, 197 N.Y. 53, 56, 90 N.E. 347, 348 (1909);
People ex rel. Davis v. Sturtevant, 9 N.Y. 263, 277-78 (1853).
82 McCormick, 59 N.Y.2d at 584, 453 N.E.2d at 513, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 284
(citing People ex rel. Drake v. Andrews, 197 N.Y. 53, 90 N.E. 347 (1909);
People ex rel. Steams v. Marr, 181 N.Y. 463, 74 N.E. 431 (1905)); In re
Goodson, 635 S.W.2d 226 (Ark. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1154 (1983); King
v. Barnes, 113 N.Y. 476, 479-80, 21 N.E. 182, 182-83 (1889).
83 People ex rel. Platt v. Rice, 144 N.Y. 249, 262, 39 N.E. 88, 92 (1894).
84 Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 458 (1975); United States v. United
Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 290-93 (1947); Kleiner v. First Nat. Bank, 751
F.2d 1193, 1207-09 (lth Cir. 1985); Baiter v. Regan, 63 N.Y.2d 630, 468
N.E.2d 688, 479 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1984); People ex rel. Negus v. Dwyer, 90 N.Y.
402, 408-09 (1882); Kampf v. Worth, 108 A.D.2d 841, 842, 485 N.Y.S.2d 344,
345 (2d Dep't 1985). Compare Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307
(1969) with Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); In re
Green, 369 U.S. 689 (1962).
85 See People ex rel. Sassower v. Cunningham, 112 A.D.2d 119, 492
N.Y.S.2d 608 (1st Dep't 1985); see also United States v. Nightingale, 703 F.2d
17, 18-19 (1st Cir. 1983) (applying Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 69 (1948)).
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A grand jury subpoena may also predicate Penal and Judiciary
Law criminal contempts. A valid subpoena, which must be in
writing," is a mandate of the court 87 -for contempt purposes, it
is "jurisdictional and conclusive."88 To the contrary, an oral direc-
tion from a prosecutor or the grand jury is not a court mandate.
Registered letters and understandings between counsel are not
considered court mandates either.89
Assuming sufficient service of a valid subpoena, the prosecution
must prove a prima facie case beyond a reasonable doubt to
establish Penal or Judiciary Law criminal contempt for nonappear-
ance.90 Regarding disobedience to a subpoena ad testificandum, a
prima facie case consists of proof of the subpoena's service and a
failure to appear. After the People have established a prima facie
case, the contemnor bears the burden of coming forward, 9' but not
the burden of proof. It is not incumbent on the People to prove a
contemnor's lack of good cause for nonappearance. This rule is
grounded in policy because the circumstances constituting good
cause for nonappearance rest peculiarly and almost exclusively
within the personal knowledge of the contemnor.
92
86 Spector v. Allen, 281 N.Y. 251, 260, 22 N.E.2d 360, 364-65 (1939); In
re Barbara, 7 A.D.2d 340, 343, 183 N.Y.S.2d 147 (3d Dep't 1959); People v.
McIntosh, 199 A.D.2d 540, 606 N.Y.S.2d 248 (2d Dep't 1993); In re Mullen,
177 Misc. 734, 31 N.Y.S.2d 710 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
87 Spector, 281 N.Y. at 259, 22 N.E.2d at 364; Manning v. Valente, 272
A.D. 358, 361,72 N.Y.S.2d 88, 91-92 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 297 N.Y. 681, 77
N.E.2d 3 (1947); see also People ex rel. Van Der Beek v. McCloskey, 18 A.D.2d
205, 209, 238 N.Y.S.2d 676 (1st Dep't 1963).
88 In re Kaplan, 8 N.Y.2d 214, 219-20, 168 N.E.2d 660, 662, 203 N.Y.S.2d
836, 839-40 (1960).
89 Spector, 281 N.Y. at 259, 260, 22 N.E.2d at 364-65; Mullen, 177 Misc.
at 737, 31 N.Y.S.2d at 714. See generally Holtzman v. Beatty, 97 A.D.2d 79, 82-
83 (2d Dep't 1983).
90 Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 444 (1911); County
of Rocklandv. Civil Serv. EmployeesAss'n, 62 N.Y.2d 11, 14, 464 N.E.2d 121,
122, 475 N.Y.S.2d 817, 818 (1984); People v. D'Amato, 12 A.D.2d 439, 445,
211 N.Y.S.2d 877, 882 (1st Dep't 1961).
91 D'Amato, 12 A.D.2d at 444-45, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 881-82; accord United
States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S. 349, 362-64 (1950); Morrison v. California, 291
U.S. 82, 88-89 (1934); Rossi v. United States, 299 U.S. 89, 91-92 (1933).
92 D'Amato, 12 A.D.2d at 445, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 882.
104
CONTEMPT ANA YLSIS
Proof of disobedience to a subpoena duces tecum has an added
twist. In addition to proof of service and nonproduction, the
prosecution must show some evidence that the subpoenaed
documents exist and that the contemnor has actual or constructive
control over them. Speculation, surmise or mere logical deduction,
standing alone, are not legally sufficient substitutes for such
proof.93 However, once the prosecution proves existence and
control, the burden of production, not proof, shifts to the contem-
nor. A contemnor may give a reasonable, good cause explanation
in lieu of production or remain mute, and possibly go to jail.94 It
is certainly true that a document custodian may assert his Fifth
Amendment privilege rather than come forward with a plausible
explanation. But the custodian's privilege is not a substitute for
proof of good cause noncompliance. Therefore, the court may not
jail contemnors for refusing to testify about unproduced, subpoe-
naed documents,95 but it may jail contemnors for their nonproduc-
tion if the documents are found to exist and the contemnors are
found to have custody or control over them.96
In proving whether subpoenaed documents exist and whether a
contemnor has custody or control of them, the law recognizes a
doctrine called "the presumption of continued existence and
possession. 97 This "presumption" is actually a permissible
9' People v. Shapolsky, 8 A.D.2d 122, 127, 185 N.Y.S.2d 639, 643-44 (1st
Dep't 1959); In re Wegman's Sons, 40 A.D. 632, 633 (1st Dep't 1899); see also
United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 330, 331 (1950); United States v.
Patterson, 219 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1955).
" Bleakley v. Schlesinger, 294 N.Y. 312, 62 N.E.2d 85 (1945); Shapolsky,
8 A.D.2d at 127, 128, 185 N.Y.S.2d at 643-45; see also Sigety v. Abrams, 632
F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1980).
9' Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 18 (1957); United States v. Edgerton,
734 F.2d 913, 920, 921 (2d Cir. 1984); Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Ferrare, 4
A.D.2d 591, 168 N.Y.S.2d 128 (3d Dep't 1957); Bradley v. O'Hare, 2 A.D.2d
436, 156 N.Y.S.2d 533 (1st Dep't 1956).
96 United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752 (1983); Bleakley, 294 N.Y. at
316-17, 62 N.E.2d at 86-87; Kuriansky v. Azam, 176 A.D.2d 943, 944, 575
N.Y.S.2d 679, 680 (2d Dep't 1991); American Cyanamid v. Fox, 36 Misc.2d
1070, 234 N.Y.S.2d 364 (Sup. Ct. 1962). See generally Kirtley v. Abrams, 184
F. Supp. 65 (E.D.N.Y. 1960).
9' "Possession," of course, may be physical, constructive, or authoritative.
For example, a warehouse manager for IBM would have physical possession of
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inference or, even more precisely, a common sense reasoning
process. Existence and present possession or control, depending on
the nature of the documents themselves and surrounding circum-
stances, may be inferred from proof of their prior existence and
possession by a contemnor.98 For example, books and records do
not self-destruct. They are not perishable fruit sold by street corner
peddlers. Their value is almost exclusive to their owner. They are
not articles of commerce flowing in and out of the marketplace.
Generally, businesses have a substantial interest in maintaining their
records. Based on these commonplace understandings, the law gives
prosecution-petitioners "the presumption of continued existence and
possession" as an aid to establishing a prima facie case of disobedi-
ence to a subpoena duces tecum.
Although it is designed to aid the establishment of a prima facie
case, the presumption of continued existence and possession is not
a substitute for good judgment. The presumption is intended to aid
reason, not override it. Contempt proceedings concerning subpoe-
naed documents are not intended to be experiments in coercion.
Credibility assessments are critically important. By parity of
reasoning, these considerations apply equally to the good cause
explanations offered by contemnors in lieu of production. Although
metaphysical certainty that documents exist and are in the control
of the contemnor is not required, good cause explanations must be
believable and believed.99
documents and records while on the premises. At home with the keys to the
warehouse, the manager would have constructive possession. IBM's chief
executive officer, who need only lift up the phone and order the manager to
produce the documents and records, would have authoritative possession and
control.
" Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1948); People v. Shapolsky, 8
A.D.2d 122, 127, 128, 185 N.Y.S.2d 639, 643-45 (1st Dep't 1959); see also
United States v. Patterson, 219 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1955); Brune v. Fraidin, 149
F.2d 325 (4th Cir. 1945); In re Arctic Garment Co., 99 F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1937).
9 Nilva v. United States, 352 U.S. 285, 295 (1957); Maggio, 333 U.S. at 66;
Combs v. Ryan's Coal Co., 785 F.2d 970, 983 (11 th Cir. 1986); Sigety v.
Abrams, 632 F.2d 969, 977 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Johnson, 247 F.2d
5, 8 (2d Cir. 1957); Lopiparo v. United States, 216 F.2d 87, 91 (8th Cir. 1954);
United States v. Goldstein, 105 F.2d 150, 152 (4th Cir. 1939).
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Even after a contemptuous act has been committed, the court
may not punish a witness for refusing to testify or produce
evidence "unless the court is shown that the evidence demanded
may be relevant and proper."'0° This judicially created proviso
has been grafted onto the Judiciary Law criminal contempt
statute... regarding contemptuous grand and trial jury witnesses.
Neither the source nor the rationale for this proviso, however, is
entirely clear. It may be that, because courts in Judiciary Law
criminal contempt proceedings are exercising their inherent powers
(restricted, but not conferred by statute), they have the concomitant
inherent power to require a pre-punishment materiality showing as
both a shield against oppression and a sword vindicating a witness's
right to refuse to provide irrelevant evidence.'0 2
Prior to imposing punishment for contempt, the court must form
an "intelligent estimate of the evidence's relevancy," commonly
referred to as "materiality." A contemnor, however, is not entitled
to a hearing on this issue." 3 "Materiality" does not have a rigid
calculus and is not a matter of degree. For grand jury purposes it
is "necessarily a term of broader import than when applied to
evidence at trial."'0 4 Materiality is not a matter on which a court
may substitute its judgment for that of a grand or petit jury by
speculating about the probable importance of evidence.0 5
100 Virag v. Hynes, 54 N.Y.2d 437, 445, 430 N.E.2d 1249, 1253, 446
N.Y.S.2d 196, 200 (1981); Spector v. Allen, 281 N.Y. 251,257, 22 N.E.2d 360,
363 (1939); Manning v. Valente, 272 A.D. 358, 362, 72 N.Y.S.2d 88, 92-93 (1st
Dep't), aff'd, 297 N.Y. 681, 77 N.E.2d 3 (1947).
'Ol N.Y. JUD. LAW § 750.
102 Additional Jan. 1979 Grand Jury v. Doe, 50 N.Y.2d 14, 21, 405 N.E.2d
194, 199, 427 N.Y.S.2d 950, 955 (1980); People v. lanniello, 21 N.Y.2d 418,
425, 235 N.E.2d 439, 443, 288 N.Y.S.2d 462, 468 (1968).
103 Gold v. Menna, 25 N.Y.2d 475, 482, 255 N.E.2d 235, 238-39, 307
N.Y.S.2d 33, 38-39 (1969); Koota v. Colombo, 17 N.Y.2d 147, 150, 216 N.E.2d
568, 568, 269 N.Y.S.2d 393, 394, cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1001 (1966); Spector,
281 N.Y. at 258, 22 N.E.2d at 363-64; Manning, 272 A.D. at 362, 72 N.Y.S.2d
at 92-93.
104 Virag, 54 N.Y.2d at 444, 430 N.E.2d at 1253, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 200; cf
People v. Scarola, 71 N.Y.2d 769, 777 (1988).
105 Manning v. Valente, 272 A.D. 358, 362, 72 N.Y.S.2d 88, 92-93 (1st
Dep't), aff'd, 297 N.Y. 681, 77 N.E.2d 3 (1947); Vanderbilt v. Hickey, 87
A.D.2d 528, 529, 448 N.Y.S.2d 3, 5-6 (1st Dep't), rev'd on other grounds, 57
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Penal Law criminal contempt does not require the same
materiality showing as Judiciary Law criminal contempt. Regarding
mere physical evidence, Penal Law criminal contempt in the second
degree,"' practically the mirror image of Judiciary Law criminal
contempt, 10 7 does not require a materiality showing, let alone
proof thereof. Regarding a refusal to testify, Penal Law criminal
contempt in the second degree uses the elements "legal and
proper," as does Judiciary criminal contempt, rather than
materiality.'0 8 Conviction of criminal contempt in the second
degree may be based on the same evidence that would underpin an
adjudication of Judiciary Law criminal contempt. Penal Law
criminal contempt in the first degree,0 9 only for testimony
refused before a grand jury, also diverges from the materiality
requirement of Judiciary Law criminal contempt. The prosecution
cannot convict on first degree criminal contempt without "proving"
the legality and propriety of testimony demanded of a grand jury
witness. A "legal" demand for testimony is one that violates no
right or privilege of a witness and is material to the proceed-
ings."' A "proper" demand is one that is "fit, suitable or appro-
priate."'.. In all instances, whether demanded testimony is legal
and proper is a question of law. 2 Thus, on a trial for first degree
criminal contempt, once a trial court determines legality and
propriety, it should charge the jury on these elements as it would
on any other question of law. 3 Criminal contempt in the first
N.Y.2d 66, 439 N.E.2d 378, 453 N.Y.S.2d 662 (1982); In re Greenleaf, 176
Misc. 566, 570 (Gen. Sess. N.Y. Cty. 1941).
106 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.50(3).
107 N.Y. JUD. LAW § 750(A)(3), (4).
10' These elements are questions of law for the court, not the jury, which
will decide the other factual elements of the crime. This issue is discussed in
greater detail infra pp. 109-110.
109 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.51.
110 In re Barnes, 204 N.Y. 108, 125, 97 N.E. 508, 513 (1912) (Werner, J.,
concurring).
... People v. McAdoo, 45 Misc.2d 664, 257 N.Y.S.2d 763 (Crim. Ct. N.Y.
Cty. 1965).
112 People v. lanniello, 36 N.Y.2d 137, 140, 145, 325 N.E.2d 146, 147, 149-
50, 365 N.Y.S.2d 821, 822, 826-27 (1975).
113 Ianniello, 36 N.Y.2d at 145-46, 325 N.E.2d at 149-50, 365 N.Y.S.2d at
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and second degree for testimonial contempt are the only crimes
where specific elements of a crime are taken away from a jury and
then charged to it as a matter of law.
Regarding grand jury witnesses, the Judiciary Law's materiality
proviso, coupled with the legality-propriety elements of Penal Law
criminal contempt in the first, but not second degree (and only in
regard to documentary evidence), creates something of an anomaly.
Criminal contempt in the first degree requires publication of the
purpose of a grand jury's investigation to prove the legality and
propriety of demanded testimony. First degree criminal contempt
carries a penalty of up to four years imprisonment. Criminal
contempt in the second degree, as applied to a grand jury witness
who defies a court mandate to produce documents, 14 contains no
legality-propriety element or materiality proviso, and thus requires
no disclosure of the nature of a grand jury's investigation.
Conviction for second degree criminal contempt may bring one
year in jail. In contrast, Judiciary Law criminal contempt, utilized
to punish the same types of conduct, carries a penalty of up to
thirty days in jail and a $1,000 fine--enough to make a martyr, but
not severely punish. Nevertheless, Judiciary Law criminal contempt,
according to the New York Court of Appeals, requires a showing
of materiality and, therefore, publication of the grand jury's
investigation.l: 5
The judiciary should reconsider requiring the prosecution to
make an open court showing of materiality in a Judiciary Law
criminal contempt proceeding. Because Judiciary Law criminal
contempt's judicially created proviso only requires that an intelli-
gently estimating court be satisfied of materiality, and without a
hearing thereon, 6 the nature of a grand jury's investigation need
not be publicly disclosed in such a punishment-limited proceeding.
An in camera materiality showing after public proof of disobedi-
ence to a court's mandate should suffice. Thirty days seems like
little flesh to trade for compromising the secrecy of a grand jury's
826-27.
114 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.50 (3).
"' Additional Jan. 1979 Grad Jury v. Doe, 50 N.Y.2d 14, 21, 405 N.E.2d
194, 200, 427 N.Y.S.2d 950, 956 (1980).
116 See supra note 91.
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investigation and the ever-present opportunity for witness tamper-
ing, harassment, or harm. 1
7
IV SUMMARY CONTEMPT: IMMEDIATE VIEW AND PRESENCE
"Upon the formation of any political body, an implied power
to preserve its own existence and promote the end and object of its
creation, necessarily results to it.""' Courts have the inherent
power "to impose silence, respect and decorum in their presence
and submission to their lawful mandates, and.., to preserve them-
selves and their officers from the approach of insults and pollu-
tion."" 9 Examples of "immediate view-and-presence" contempt
include refusing to leave the courtroom; 20 returning to the
courtroom after being ordered to leave; 12' deliberately bringing
witnesses back into the courtroom in defiance of an order
previously excluding them; 12 and perjury on the witness stand
during trial, but only under the "exceptional circumstance" where
the witness obstructs the court in the performance of its duty. 23
The court can also enforce its summary contempt power against a
grand jury witness who refuses, in the presence of the court, to
answer questions before a grand jury. 24 In contrast, an accusation
of bias or unfairness offered with a civil tongue is not contempt.
Mere strenuous, even vociferous, advocacy is not considered
contempt either. 25 But it must always be remembered that much
"' This argument has not as yet been offered to the courts for their
imprimatur or condemnation.
118 United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 33 (1812).
11 Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 204 (1821).
12' Rodriguez v. Feinberg, 48 A.D.2d 971, 369 N.Y.S.2d 825 (3d Dep't
1975), rev'd, 40 N.Y.2d 994, 359 N.E.2d 665, 391 N.Y.S.2d 69 (1976).
121 Gumbs v. Martinis, 40 A.D.2d 194, 338 N.Y.S.2d 817 (1st Dep't 1972).
122 LaDuca v. Bergin, 86 A.D.2d 983, 448 N.Y.S.2d 318 (4th Dep't 1982).
123 In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 228 (1945); Exparte Hudgings, 249 U.S.
378, 383 (1919). See generally Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 2 (1933).
124 In re Epstein, 43 Misc.2d 987, 252 N.Y.S.2d 771 (Sup. Ct. 1964); cf
Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965).
25 Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697 (1974); In re Little, 404 U.S. 553
(1972); Holt v. Virginia, 381 U.S. 131 (1965); In re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230
(1962); Marino v. Burstein, 72 A.D.2d 814, 421 N.Y.S.2d 904 (2d Dep't 1979).
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depends on the speaker's tone of voice, facial expression and
physical gesture.
126
Contemptuous lawyers, defendants, or witnesses during jury
trials present special concerns. The summary contempt power exists
to control a courtroom, not to prejudice a defendant's right to a fair
trial. But a judge is duty-bound to keep a trial based on rules of
evidence and civility moving forward. Under case law and court
rules, a judge need not wait until the end of trial to take actions
against a lawyer's obstructive antics. If a court must use its
summary power, it may do so by (1) removing the jury from the
courtroom; (2) holding the contemptuous lawyer in contempt; (3)
imposing punishment; (4) filling out a mandate of commitment to
reflect the same; (5) staying execution of its mandate until the end
of trial; (6) returning the jury to the courtroom; and (7) telling a
chastened lawyer to proceed. The same procedure may be used in
dealing with a contemptuous witness or defendant. However, the
summary contempt power "is of limited utility in dealing with an
incorrigible, a cunning psychopath, or an accused bent on frustrat-
ing the . . . trial or undermining the processes of justice,"'' 27 thus
leaving binding, gagging, or summary removal from the courtroom
as the truly effective remedies for these individuals.12
Contemptuous courtroom spectators present none of the
aforementioned concerns about lawyers, defendants, or witnesses.
As noted by Chief Judge Breitel, "Any particular spectator is quite
dispensable as are all spectators if disorderly." They are "absolutely
silent nonactors with the right only to use their eyes and ears." '129
Essentially, a disruptive courtroom spectator, absolutely stated and
in the nature of things, should be readily subject to contempt
punishment without any of the complications that apply to the
trial's participants.
126 Little, 404 U.S. at 556 (Burger, C.J. & Rehnquist, J., concurring).
127 Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 467 (1971) (Burger, C.J.
concurring).
121 Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970); People v. Palermo, 32 N.Y.2d
222, 298 N.E.2d 61, 344 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1973).
129 Katz v. Murtagh, 28 N.Y.2d 234, 240, 269 N.E.2d 816, 820, 321
N.Y.S.2d 104, 109 (1971).
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Misbehavior in the immediate view and presence of the court,
standing alone, does not wake the summary contempt power. The
misbehavior must be, or threaten to be, an actual obstruction to the
court's proceedings or authority. For example, one Cooke sent a
nasty letter to a court, asking it to recuse itself on the ground of
bias. The U.S. Supreme Court set aside his contempt citation.
Cooke's conduct was not "an open threat to the orderly procedure
of the Court and such a flagrant defiance of the person and
presence of the judge before the public," which if not "instantly
suppressed and punished demoralization of the court's authority
would follow."13
Contempt may occur in a court's "presence" but not necessarily
in its "immediate view." There is a difference between assaulting
a court officer in the courtroom and "fixing" a petit juror in the
cloakroom. Both actions are in the court's presence, but only the
assault was in the court's immediate view, thus authorizing
summary punishment without advance notice."' The former is a
direct and immediate threat to the court's authority, the latter is
not. 132 New York is bound by and agrees with the U.S. Supreme
Court in its distinction between mere "presence," as opposed to
"presence" plus "immediate view" contempts. 33
New York courts may impose punishment for contemptuous
behavior committed in their immediate view and presence within
the parameters set by the Judiciary Law. " To say the least,
Judiciary Law contempt statutes are specific and strictly
construed. 135 In fact, the First and Second Departments of the
130 Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 536 (1925).
131 Compare In re Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 307-08 (1888) with Exparte Savin,
131 U.S. 267, 277 (1889).
132 Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 536 (1925). See generally Young
v. United States ex rel. Vuitton, 481 U.S. 787 (1987).
133 Katz, 28 N.Y.2d at 237-39, 269 N.E.2d at 817-19, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 106-
07; Douglas v. Adel, 269 N.Y. 144, 146-47, 199 N.E. 35, 36-37 (1935).
134 See N.Y. JUD. LAW §§ 750(A)(1), (2), (3); 751 (1); 752 and 755. N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 215.50(1) punishes "immediate-view-and-presence"contempt as
a misdemeanor, though § 215.50(1) case law is nonexistent except for People v.
Giglio, 74 A.D.2d 348, 428 N.Y.S.2d 27 (2d Dep't 1980).
13' The federal counterparts are 18 U.S.C. § 401 and FED. R. Civ. P. 42 (a).
This of course, is not to say that, on occasion, law clerks for the Supreme Court
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New York Appellate Divisions have promulgated rules regulating
the summary contempt power. Largely reflective of case law, the
rules essentially provide that a court shall only impose summary
contempt in exceptionally necessitous circumstances. For a New
York court to exercise its summary contempt power, the offending
conduct must actually disrupt or threaten to disrupt the proceedings
and any alternative remedies must be insufficient.
Wherever practical, according to the New York Appellate
Division rules, punishment for immediate-view-and-presence
contempt should be determined and imposed at the time of the
adjudication of contempt. Appellate Division rules in the First and
Second Departments require that if a contempt in the immediate
view and presence of the court is not punished as immediately as
circumstances permit, the contempt may then be punished only
after notice and plenary hearing. 3 6 But where advisable, adjudi-
cation of contempt may first occur with punishment briefly
deferred. The contemnor must have a reasonable opportunity to
make a statement in defense or extenuation prior to summary
adjudication. Except for the most flagrant behavior requiring
immediate action to preserve order, a contemnor should be warned
and given an opportunity to desist. Where adjudication occurs
immediately, but the contemnor desists from further misbehavior,
the court may consider whether execution of punishment is
necessary. In all other cases, the contempt shall be adjudicated at
a plenary hearing with notice, written charges, assistance of
counsel, compulsory process and the right of confrontation.'
In Sacher v United States,138 the U.S. Supreme Court empha-
sized the importance of timely and fair adjudications for summary
and Courts of Appeals will not dig up "contempts of court are crimes in the
ordinary sense" when they need this falsehood for a desired result. See, e.g.,
United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993); International Union - United
Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 114 S. Ct. 2552 (1994). See generally United
States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 692-700 (1964).
136 Werlin v. Goldberg, 129 A.D.2d 334, 336, 341-42, 917 N.Y.S.2d 745,
746, 749-50 (2d Dep't 1987); Zols v. Lakritz, 74 Misc.2d 322, 344 N.Y.S.2d 626
(Sup. Ct. 1973).
137 22 N.Y. COMp. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, §§ 604.2, 701.2, 701.3, 701.4
(1993).
13 343 U.S. 1, 5, 7, (1952).
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contempt. Following a jury's verdict in a lengthy and extraordi-
narily contentious trial, one Sacher and other lawyers were
summarily imprisoned for outrageously contemptuous conduct in
the immediate view and presence of the court during trial. It was
contended that the trial court's summary contempt power expired
with the jury's verdict and, therefore, any contempt adjudication
had to be on notice with an opportunity to defend.' 9 In affirming
the contempt, the U.S. Supreme Court held that "summary" does
not refer to the timing of the summary contempt power's exercise
but rather "to a procedure which dispenses with the formality, delay
and digression that would result from the issuance of process."' 40
The purpose of process is only to inform a court of events not
occurring within its personal knowledge. "Reasons for permitting
straightway exercise of summary power are not reasons for
compelling or encouraging its immediate exercise.' 14 A contrary
holding "would be an incentive to pronounce, while smarting under
the irritation of the contemptuous act, what should be a well-
considered judgment.,' 142 The Court said that summary contempt
could be immediately imposed if delay would prejudice the
trial.143 On the other hand, if trial exigencies required, deferred
action was also permissible.' 4 The force of this logic notwith-
standing, later Supreme Court decisions imported those difficulties
inherent in either measuring or mitigating the effects of the
summary contempt power-a power whose very existence depends
on its purpose, which is instant punishment to maintain order in a
courtroom. 145
139 Id.
140 Id. at 9.
141 Id. at 9-10.
142 Id. at 11.
143 Id.
144 id.
14' An "activist-seeking-combat" judge, according to the record, became
personally embroiled with a contemptuous lawyer, did not act instantly, but
instead held him in contempt after trial. In reversing, the Supreme Court stated
that the pith of the summary contempt power is "that the necessities of the
administration of justice require such dealing with obstruction to it." Offutt v.
United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954). It is wholly unrelated to the judge's
individual sensibilities, be they tender or rugged. "But judges also are human,
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Summary punishment for contempt is a power peculiar to a
unique evil, the relationship between which, courts, from early on,
have characterized as "the least possible power adequate to the end
proposed."'46 This characterization has been understood, misun-
derstood, deliberately applied and misapplied to achieve a desired
result. Analytical, orderly, practical and comprehensible case law
have commensurately suffered. The U.S. Supreme Court has
obscured summary contempt's essence, which is a power derived
from the implication of necessity, but extending no further than
such implied necessity justifies.'47 "The least possible power
adequate to the end proposed" is an adjectival phrase modifying the
essence of a functioning judiciary's self-preserving power, born of
and implied by the very evil which would destroy it. A tug of war
has resulted between decisions emphasizing summary contempt's
practical essence and those echoing its theoretical characterization.
A historical analysis of the constitutionally mandated procedures
circumscribing immediate-view-and-presence summary contempt is
the least likely to mislead because recent Supreme Court decisions
and may in a human way, quite unwittingly identify offense to self with
obstruction to law." Id. Without sanctioning any notion that a judge may be run
out of a case by simply stoking the fire of personal abuse, the Court held that at
least where adjudication and punishment is delayed, neutral justice must satisfy
the appearance of neutral justice. This goal could only be effectuated, under
deferred punishment circumstances, by a trial judge not sitting in judgment where
the contempt is entangled with the judge's personal feelings. "These are subtle
matters." Id.
146 Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 230-31 (1821).
141 Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 541-42 (1917). The Supreme Court
unanimously stated in International Union - United Mine Workers of America v.
Bagwell, 114 S. Ct. 2552 (1994), that:
our jurisprudence in the contempt area has attempted to balance the
competing concern of necessity and potential arbitrariness by allowing
a relatively unencumbered contempt power when its exercise is most
essential, and requiring progressively greater procedural protections
when other considerations come into play. The necessity justification
for the contempt authority is at its pinnacle, of course, where contuma-
cious conduct threatens a court's immediate ability to conduct its
proceedings, such as where a witness refuses to testify, or a party
disrupts the court.
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simply defy satisfactory synthesis.'48 In re Terry,149 one of the
earliest Supreme Court decisions regarding summary contempt
power, involved a California federal judge ordering a defendant's
wife to be removed from the courtroom. The defendant, who fled
after assaulting the marshall, contended that his contempt citation
was void because it was made in his absence. The Court disagreed
with the defendant, holding that jurisdiction of the person attaches
at the instant of the contemptuous act.1 ° Recent Supreme Court
decisions vacillate on how a court can properly adjudicate immedi-
ate-view-and-presence contempt. In Mayberry v Pennsylvania,5'
for example, the Court was concerned about judges' impartiality in
presiding over contempt proceedings when they have been the
object of personal contemptuous attacks during trial, which later
formed the very basis of those proceedings. The Court, while
acknowledging that a judge could not be driven off a case simply
because counsel increased the level of personal abuse against that
judge, essentially stated that "by reason of the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment a defendant in criminal contempt
proceedings should be given a public trial before a judge other than
the one reviled by the contemnor."' 52 The Supreme Court's rule
in Mayberry seemed clear until it encountered Taylor v Hayes.'53
.48 Compare Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 463-64 (1971) and
Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, 214 (1971) with Codispoti v. Pennsylvania,
418 U.S. 506, 524 (1974) (Rehnquist, J. & Berger, C.J., dissenting).
149 Exparte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 310-12 (1888).
150 The question of whether the trial court would have retained authority to
summarily punish Terry on a later date without notice and hearing was
specifically left open by the Court. Id. at 314. Absent sufficient averment to the
contrary there is a presumption in favor of a court's summary contempt
jurisdiction. Exparte Cuddy, 131 U.S. 280, 186 (1889).
A year later, the Court acknowledged that contemptuously disruptive
misbehavior could occur in a court's immediate view and presence without the
judge being personally and simultaneously cognizant of it. Ex parte Savin, 131
U.S. 267, 278 (1889).
... 400 U.S. 455 (1971).
152 Id. at 466 (emphasis added).
153 Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974). On nine occasions during the trial,
Taylor was told "that he was in contempt of court." At the trial's end, the Court
made a statement regarding Taylor's trial conduct, but refused his request to
respond. Stating "'I have you' on nine counts, [the judge] proceeded to impose
CONTEMPT ANA YLSIS
In Taylor, the Court was "convinced that [a contemnor] ... should
not be tried by [the same trial judge] since contemptuous conduct,
though short ofpersonal attack, may still provoke a trial judge and
so embroil him.., that he cannot hold the balance nice, clear and
true." '154 According to the Taylor majority, the inquiry was no
longer whether there was actual bias, but whether there was the
likelihood or appearance of bias.' Alternatively, the Supreme
Court held in Codispoti that this particular contemnor was entitled
to a jury at his contempt proceeding.'56 The Court reasoned that
a jail term on each count totalling almost four and one-half years." Persuaded by
Taylor's contention that he was entitled to more of a hearing and notice than he
received "prior to final conviction and sentence," the Court reversed. Id at 496.
The Court seemed to play with semantics in reasoning that no sentence was
imposed during trial and that it did not appear that a final contempt adjudication
was entered until after the jury's verdict. Contradicting its own statement of the
facts, the Court stated that "[ilt was [only] then that the court proceeded to
describe and characterize [Taylor's] various acts during trial as contemptuous, to
find him guilty of ... contempt, and to sentence him immediately." Id. at 496-
97. Notwithstanding its "decisions establish[ing] that summary punishment need
not always be imposed during trial if it is to be permitted at all," the Court ruled
that the procedure employed against Taylor "[did] not square with the Due
Process Clause." Id. at 497-98 (emphasis added). An earlier case, said the Court,
involving contempt of a legislature, Groppie v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496 (1972), but
with no factual similarity to Taylor's courtroom conduct, somehow "counsel[ed]
that before an attorney is finally adjudicated in contempt and sentenced after trial
for conduct during trial, he should have reasonable notice of the specific charges
and an opportunity to be heard in his own behalf." Taylor, 418 U.S. at 498-99.
'5 Id. at 501 (emphasis added).
'" Id. The Taylor dissenters pointed out that the wisdom of the Court's
majority was at odds with the very precedents its opinion purported to reaffirm.
Id. (Rehnquist, J. & Burger, C.J., dissenting).
156 Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506 (1974). This case also involved
a lawyer, Codispoti, who in the course of his contemptuous trial conduct accused
the judge of railroading the defendant, of being crazy, a Caesar and being in a
criminal conspiracy. Id. at 507 n. 1. Following the Supreme Court's instructions,
attending reversal of Codispoti's client's contempt adjudication, that another
judge preside over the client's de novo contempt hearing, Codispoti was tried
before a different judge. The state rested on the trial transcript; Codispoti offered
no evidence. He was found guilty of six separate contempts and sentenced to five
consecutive terms of six months imprisonment. Should Codispoti have been
afforded a jury trial? Generally "no" but in this instance "yes." A contemnor,
according to the Court, is not entitled to a jury trial simply because a strong
117
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"in the context of the post-verdict adjudication of various acts of
contempt, it appears to us that there is posed the very likelihood of
arbitrary action that the requirement of jury trial was intended to
avoid or alleviate.""1 7 According to the Court, since the contem-
nor in Codispoti was tried seriatim in one proceeding, with separate
consecutive sentences for each contempt aggregating more than six
months, he was tried for the equivalent of a serious offense for
which a jury trial was required.' 58
Stripped of all obscuring verbiage, a trial court's summary
contempt power is raw power. It forcefully decides that the judge,
possibility of substantial punishment exists regardless of the punishment actually
imposed. Id. Moreover, a trial judge does not exhaust his or her power to punish
for contempt once the aggregate punishment for separate contemptuous acts
exceeds six months. Id. at 514. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court reversed.
The present Supreme Court, in dicta from its unanimous opinion in
International Union - United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell, 114 S. Ct.
2552 (1994), has now put further confusion into the mix of Sacher, Mayberry,
Taylor and Codispoti by stating that:
If a court delays punishing a[n] .. . [immediate-view-and-presence]
contempt until the completion of trial, for example, due process
requires that the contemnor's right to notice and a hearing be
respected. There "it is much more difficult to argue that action [i.e.,
contempt imposed after completion of trial] without notice of hearing
of any kind is necessary to preserve order and enable [the court] to
proceed with its business, . . . [particularly] in view of the heightened
potential for abuse posed by the contempt power."
International Union - United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 114 S. Ct. 2552
(1994) (citing with approval Taylor, 418 U.S. at 495).
117 Taylor, 418 U.S. at 515-16.
"8 Id. at 516, 517. Codispoti's four-justice dissent was "at a loss" to see
what legitimate role a jury could play for direct, in court, trial-obstructive
contempts. "The perceived need to remove the case from the contemned judge
is fully served by assigning the case to a different judge" and "since the new
judge, not the jury, will impose the sentence, there is nothing the jury can do by
way of mitigating an excessive punishment." Id. at 523 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
In Codispoti and other decisions, the Supreme Court has consistently used
the word "sentence" when it desired a given result. Contemnors are adjudicated,
not sentenced. The Court demonstrates its latest use of penal law terms to
describe a court's inherent contempt power in United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct.
2849 (1993) (inter alia, the Court's order to show cause consisted of "counts").
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not the contemnor, runs a courtroom. While cool reflection, if
practical under given circumstances, is preferable to heat and haste,
such reflection presupposes delay which in turn draws into question
whether summary contempt was necessary in the first place." 9 If
not necessary in the first place, then the summary contempt power
neverhad necessity to give it birth. 6 ° The syllogism is reversed
if heat and haste prevail.'
V COMPLICATIONS IN PUNISHING CONTEMPT
A. Double Jeopardy Considerations Affecting Penal and
Judiciary Law Contempts by Grand Jury Witnesses
While an unlawfully recalcitrant grand jury witness may be
convicted under Penal Law or punished under Judiciary Law, the
159 See, e.g., Breitbart v. Galligan, 135 A.D.2d 323, 525 N.Y.S.2d 219 (1st
Dep't 1988).
160 United States v. Sacher, 182 F.2d 416, 456-57 (2d Cir. 1950) (Frank, J.,
concurring), aff'd, 343 U.S. 1 (1952).
16 All the high-sounding, content-empty, ambiguous phraseology one can
conjure up will not improve upon, much less equal, the force of Second Circuit
Court of Appeals Judge Jerome Frank's logic arrayed against those who would
contend that summary punishment delayed is summary contempt power lost or
diluted. His reasoning is drastically paraphrased here. Summary punishment has
only a future effect, for the contemptuous obstruction of a court's business has,
in the nature of things, already occurred and cannot be prevented. No punishment
will undo an "immediate-view-and-presence"contempt, ever a thing of the past.
Therefore, the summary contempt power cannot be founded on an ability to
prevent the punished behavior. Its effect is wholly prospective. Hence, it must
be justified by the fact that it will deter future misconduct during the same
litigation or in future cases. Sacher, 182 F.2d at 456. The argument that
summary contempt punishment must be instanter (invalid if postponed) means
that a judge may act summarily only when, without a hearing, he is least likely
to be poised and temperate. Why such action would constitute fairness and due
process, while calmer postponed action would not defy reason. "If we instruct
trial judges that summary punishment of such contempts must invariably be
imposed at once, [this] means that trial judges may punish only when they act
in hot blood, i.e., in circumstances promoting, to the utmost, impatient, ill-
considered judgment." Id. The present state of the law from Supreme Court
decisions would probably seem to Judge Frank "exactly upside-down." Id.
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federal Constitution's double jeopardy clause precludes the
imposition of both sanctions for the same transaction. For example,
in Colombo v New York, 16 2 the defendant was punished for
Judiciary Law criminal contempt when he disobeyed a court order
that commanded his return to a grand jury before which he had
previously remained mute. After serving thirty days in jail, he was
then indicted for Penal Law contempt. 163 After the appellate court
dismissed Colombo's indictment, 164 the Court of Appeals
reinstated it,'65 but the U.S. Supreme Court vacated and
remanded for reconsideration. 66 The Court of Appeals adhered
to its original determination, viewing Judiciary and Penal Law
contempt as serving the distinct purposes of coercion versus
punishment for crime. 167 Again, the Supreme Court remanded
"for further consideration in view of the ... Court of Appeals'
misconception of the nature of the contempt judgment [under the
Judiciary Law] ... for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
"168
Little guidance, let alone unanimity, can be gleaned from
Colombo's appeals, which were never set down for full argument
before the U.S. Supreme Court. On the second remand, the Court
of Appeals reversed its earlier decisions, but implicitly approved
the sequential imposition of punishment under the Judiciary and
Penal Laws for distinct, though transactionally-related, acts of
disobedience.'69 According to this reasoning, a grand jury
162 People v. Colombo, 32 A.D.2d 812, 302 N.Y.S.2d 488 (2d Dep't), aft'd,
25 N.Y.2d 641, 254 N.E.2d 340, 306 N.Y.S.2d 258 (1969).
163 Koota v. Colombo, 17 N.Y.2d 147, 216 N.E.2d 568, 269 N.Y.S.2d 393,
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1001 (1966); People v. Colombo, 32 A.D.2d 812, 302
N.Y.S.2d 488 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 25 N.Y.2d 641, 254 N.E.2d 340, 306 N.Y.S.2d
258 (1969).
164 People v. Colombo, 32 A.D.2d 812, 302 N.Y.S.2d 488 (2d Dep't), aft'd,
25 N.Y.2d 641, 254 N.E.2d 340, 306 N.Y.S.2d 258 (1969).
161 People v. Colombo, 29 N.Y.2d 1, 271 N.E.2d 694, 323 N.Y.S.2d 161
(1971).
166 Colombo v. New York, 400 U.S. 16 (1970).
167 People v. Colombo, 29 N.Y.2d 1, 271 N.E.2d 694, 323 N.Y.S.2d 161
(1971).
161 Colombo v. New York, 405 U.S. 9, 11 (1972).
169 People v. Colombo, 31 N.Y.2d 947, 239 N.E.2d 247, 341 N.Y.S.2d 97
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witness's naked refusal to testify or produce evidence is a Penal
Law contempt when it occurs and disobedience to subsequent court
order can be punished separately, because it occurs only after the
order's issuance.
The U.S. Supreme Court ultimately rejected the Court of
Appeals' rationale that a grand jury witness can be punished
separately for penal contempt and judicial contempt because the
acts of contempt do not occur simultaneously. 70 In Menna v
New York, 17 1 the defendant flatly refused to testify before a grand
jury and subsequently disobeyed a court order commanding him to
do so. Menna's Judiciary Law contempt for disobeying the court's
"return" order was upheld, 72 but his subsequent Penal Law
conviction for the criminal contempt-a guilty plea based solely on
his distinct initial recalcitrance before the grand jury-was vacated
by a philosophically splintered Supreme Court.173 The Court of
Appeals' memorandum on remand without discussion concluded,
with the prosecutor's concurrence, that the double jeopardy clause
barred Menna's Penal Law prosecution. 174 Since the Colombo and
Menna cases were decided, the membership of both courts has
almost totally changed. The proverbial "last word" may still await
prosecutor and grand jury contemnor. 175 That last word may be
United States v. Dixon.176 In Dixon, another badly splintered
Supreme Court held that where a criminal contempt of court does
not have the "same elements" as a legislatively-enacted crime, a
contempt proceeding followed by a criminal prosecution does not
(1972); Capio v. Justices of Supreme Court, 41 A.D.2d 235, 342 N.Y.S.2d 100
(2d Dep't 1973).
"70 Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975).
71 People v. Menna, 38 N.Y.2d 850, 345 N.E.2d 599, 382 N.Y.S.2d 56
(1976).
172 Gold v. Menna, 25 N.Y.2d 475, 255 N.E.2d 235, 307 N.Y.S.2d 33
(1969).
173 Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975).
174 People v. Menna, 38 N.Y.2d 850, 345 N.E.2d 599, 382 N.Y.S.2d 56
(1976); see also People v. Prescott, 66 N.Y.2d 216, 218, 220-21, 486 N.E.2d
813, 813-14, 495 N.Y.S.2d 955, 956 (1985).
175 See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 755 F.2d 984, 987, 989 (2d Cir. 1985);
United States v. Esposito, 633 F. Supp. 544 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
176 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
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involve double jeopardy. The opinion, however, is as confusing as
it is lengthy.
B. Multiplicity: Penal and Judiciary Law Contempts
Penal Law contempt indictments are multiplicitous when
separate contempts are charged based on repeated refusals to
answer either the same questions or questions relating to one
subject area.'77 There are two tests for determining whether a
Penal Law contempt indictment is multiplicitous. The first test
requires identifying the distinct subject areas of inquiry. The second
test, objectively assessed and recognizable in advance, involves
determining the scope of a witness's refusal to answer. Under either
test, the remedy for multiplicity is not dismissal, but rather a
limitation of punishment.17 8
Questions relating to the same subject matter, met by evasion
or outright refusals to answer, present a comparatively uncompli-
cated issue for pretrial motion. Difficulty arises in situations where
different subject areas of inquiry are met with refusals or evasions
which, in their nature, preclude advance, objective assessment.
Should the witness who refuses to answer some questions under
various guises be worse off than one who remains stone silent? 79
Surprisingly, the policy of the law seems to have settled on the
encouragement of testimony by treating a witness willing to testify
in most areas of inquiry, save one or more, no worse than one
unwilling to give any testimony.8 ° As for Judiciary Law con-
tempt punishment arising out of grand jury proceedings,
multiplicity does not arise when questioning occurs during different
... People v. Riela, 7 N.Y.2d 571, 578, 166 N.E.2d 840, 843, 200 N.Y.S.2d
43, 47 (1960).
178 People v. Mulligan, 29 N.Y.2d 20, 24, 272 N.E.2d 62, 64, 323 N.Y.S.2d
681, 683 (1971).
179 People v. Cianciola, 86 Misc.2d 976, 981, 383 N.Y.S.2d 159, 163-64
(Sup. Ct. 1976), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. People v. Dercole, 72 A.D.2d
318, 424 N.Y.S.2d 459 (2d Dep't 1980), appeal dismissed, 52 N.Y.2d 956, 419
N.E.2d 869, 437 N.Y.S.2d 966 (1981).
180 United States v. Coachman, 752 F.2d 685, 691-92 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(quoting Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66, 73 (1957)).
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sessions of the same grand jury or before different grand juries.
Thirty days in jail does not confer de facto immunity from later
questioning of the same witness on the same subject matter. 8'
C. The Contempt Trap: A Legalism In Search of a Factual
Home
The function of a grand jury investigation is to seek evidence
of antecedent crime, not to create crime during the course of its
proceedings by manipulating witnesses into committing contempt.
In dicta, the Court of Appeals has coined the phrase "contempt
trap" to describe "an argument grounded, by analogy, on the
concept of a perjury trap."' 82 A prosecutor, the court holds, "may
not... attempt to trap the witness into giving confusing or evasive
replies."' 83 Whether a contempt trap has been improperly sprung
is ordinarily a factual question unless one is found to exist as a
matter of law.'84
In essence, the "contempt trap" is an unnecessary legalism in
search of a factual home because it is a conceptual contradiction.
By recognizing the existence of a "contempt trap," the court
acknowledges that a witness can commit excusable contempt.
However, none of the court's decisions regarding contempt suggest
that there is such a thing as excusable contempt before a grand
jury. There are many ways for grand jury witnesses to vindicate
their rights. Being contemptuous is not one of them. "No witness
'l People ex rel. Cirillo v. Warden of the City Prison, 14 A.D.2d 875 (2d
Dep't 1961), aff'd, 11 N.Y.2d 51, 181 N.E.2d 424, 226 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1962);
Second Additional Grand Jury v. Cirillo, 16 A.D.2d 605, 230 N.Y.S.2d 303,
aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d 206, 188 N.E.2d 138, 237 N.Y.S.2d 709 (1963); Second
Additional Grand Jury v. Cirillo, 19 A.D.2d 555, 241 N.Y.S.2d 8 (2d Dep't
1963).
182 People v. Fischer, 53 N.Y.2d 178, 183 n. 1, 423 N.E.2d 349, 351 n. 1,440
N.Y.S.2d 872, 874 n.1 (1981).
' People v. Rappaport, 47 N.Y.2d 308, 314, 391 N.E.2d 1284, 1288, 418
N.Y.S.2d 306, 309-10 (emphasis added).
184 Fischer, 53 N.Y.2d at 183 n.1,,423 N.E.2d at 351 n.1, 440 N.Y.S.2d at
874 n.1; People v. Tyler, 46 N.Y.2d 251, 258-59, 389 N.E.2d 1224, 1228-29,
413 N.Y.S.2d 295, 299-300 (1978).
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has a license to testify evasively or falsely before the grand
jury."' 85 Moreover, "[a] witness may not disregard his oath to tell
the truth in the first instance."' 8 6 The theoretical justification of
the contempt-trap doctrine is the integrity of the prosecutorial,
grand jury and judicial process. But the integrity of all three
institutions can be preserved without free-floating, amorphous
metaphors. The question of whether a "contempt trap" was set and
sprung, in terms familiar, if not prosaic, will always be one of
evidentiary sufficiency. An ordinary pretrial motion to inspect and
dismiss is sufficient to determine whether as a matter of law there
is a question of fact for a jury. If not dismissed on the motion,
counsel's summation and the common sense of the fact-finder are
the only remaining means to determine whether a contempt trap
was actually effected.
The contempt trap doctrine imports confusion into the law. If
a court on pretrial motion decides that a grand jury witness was not
trapped, then what is the permissible scope of defense counsel's
argument thereon to a jury? Mere prosecutorial anticipation of
contempt counts for nothing. 187 What about the witness intellect
and free will? True, the questioner controls the questions, but it is
the witness who controls the answers alleged to constitute "confus-
ing or evasive replies." The Court of Appeals could alleviate any
confusion about "entrapping" grand jury witnesses by setting aside
the misconceived notion of a contempt trap once and for all.
D. Purgation of Penal and Judiciary Law Contempts
An indictment for criminal contempt before a grand jury may
never be purged.'88 Nevertheless, addressing an issue which was
185 People v. McGrath, 46 N.Y.2d 12, 29, 385 N.E.2d 541, 549, 412
N.Y.S.2d 801, 810 (1978); People v. Ianniello, 21 N.Y.2d 418, 235 N.E.2d 439,
288 N.Y.S.2d 462 (1968).
186 People v. Ezaugi, 2 N.Y.2d 439, 443, 141 N.E.2d 580, 583, 161
N.Y.S.2d 75, 78 (1957).
187 Tyler, 46 N.Y.2d at 262, 385 N.E.2d at 1230-31, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 300-01;
accord United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115 (1980); United States v.
Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 340-41 (1950).
18 People v. Leone, 44 N.Y.2d 315, 317-18, 376 N.E.2d 1287, 1288, 405
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"unnecessary to reach," the Court of Appeals stated that "probably
incorrect, is the conclusion that under no circumstances may a
'criminal' [Judiciary Law] summary contempt be purged."' 89 This
pronouncement ignores the fundamental distinction between civil
and criminal contempt as well as prior opinions from the U.S.
Supreme Court and the New York Court of Appeals.'9" This
aside, the dictum lacks practical policy justification for its obfusca-
tion of the distinct goals served by coercion for future private
benefit and punishment for past public wrong.
The Court of Appeals' dictum conflicts with its earlier state-
ments, which, for example, assert that "taking the witness before
the court may reduce stalling tactics."'' On the contrary, proving
a grand jury or trial contemnor guilty of Judiciary Law criminal
contempt beyond a reasonable doubt only to allow purgation as of
right does anything but expedite matters. Purgation-by the
contemnor's doing what he or she was ordered to do in the first
place-should be the very rare exception, not the rule. In fact, the
court's negatively-phrased dictum concedes as much if stated
positively.
In regard to purgation, prosecutors are duty-bound not to waste
their time on efforts reasonably perceived as futile. If a Judiciary
Law criminal contempt is-without predictably strict, intelligible
limit-subject to a right of purgation, it is not an expeditious
response to contemptuous conduct before grand and petit juries. For
a time, the court's free grant of purgation was the clearly unwise
pattern-a pattern which invited "indictment-or-nothing." A middle
ground-Judiciary Law criminal contempt-was considered viable
until a trend of decisions indiscriminately applied the Court of
Appeals' "purge" dictum.'92 Fortunately, the trend may now be
N.Y.S.2d 642, 642-43 (1978).
189 Leone, 44 N.Y.2d at 318, 376 N.E.2d at 1288, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 643.
190 See, e.g., People ex rel. Munsell v. Court of Oyer & Terminer, 101 N.Y.
245, 247-49, 4 N.E. 259, 259-61 (1886); see also Gompers v. Buck's Stove &
Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911).
191 People v. Rappaport, 47 N.Y.2d 308, 314, 391 N.E.2d 1284, 1288, 418
N.Y.S.2d 306, 309 (1979).
192 Additional Jan. 1979 Grand Jury v. Doe, 84 A.D.2d 588, 444 N.Y.S.2d
201 (3d Dep't 1981); Ferrara v. Hynes, 63 A.D.2d 675, 404 N.Y.S.2d 674 (2d
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moving in a more responsible direction.'93 Hollow sanctions or
those reasonably perceived as hollow are appropriate to neither
child rearing nor a court system. Judiciary Law criminal contempt
sanctions should deter disobedience, not encourage more contempt
proceedings.
CONCLUSION
The Judiciary Law sections and case law defining and regulat-
ing criminal and civil contempt are long overdue for reassessment
and revision. Although this may not be the place to work out a
detailed legislative revision, the New York State Legislature would
be wise to hone and codify the practical wisdom of case law
together with the contemporary experience of the bench and bar to
redraft contempt law.194 In fact, the United States Code presents
a worthy model for simplifying contempt law. 95 The Code
unequivocally states that:
Whenever a witness in any proceeding before or ancillary
to any court or grand jury . . . refuses without just cause
shown to comply with an order of the court to testify or
provide other information including any ... document, the
court, upon such refusal, or when such refusal is duly
brought to its attention, may summarily [without a jury]
order his confinement ... until such time as the witness is
willing to give such testimony or provide such information.
No period of such confinement shall exceed the life of (1)
the court proceeding, or (2) the term of the grand jury,
including extensions, before which such refusal to comply
with the court order occurred, but in no event shall such
confinement exceed eighteen months.
Dep't 1978); People v. Belge, 59 A.D.2d 307, 309, 399 N.Y.S.2d 539, 540-41
(4th Dep't 1977).
"9 Department of Envtl. Protection v. Department of Envtl. Conservation,
70 N.Y.2d 233, 513 N.E.2d 706, 519 N.Y.S.2d 539 (1987); People v.
Williamson, 136 A.D.2d 497, 523 N.Y.S.2d 817 (1st Dep't 1988).
194 In fact, the New York State Law Revision Commission discussed revising
several aspects of New York contempt law when it convened in April 1994.
195 See 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1988); 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (1988).
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New York contempt law, in its present state, is exceedingly
difficult to comprehend, let alone apply. Those who have commit-
ted no wrong should not be erroneously held in contempt. Alterna-
tively, those guilty of contemptuous behavior should, just as
urgently, be correctly held in contempt with appropriate dispatch.
What is "correct" and what is "erroneous" should be simplified and
clarified-"bright lines" and appellate court restraint are far from
a call to heresy.
Regrettably, New York Judiciary Law contempt jurisprudence
has become "mingled and confused by the use of fixed but
ambiguous nomenclature"'96 at the expense of reasoned analysis.
The courts, for example, continue to mislabel judiciary contempts
as "criminal" or "civil." Innumerable decisions-some with a sterile
and lamentably obvious impetus to effect a desired result-misap-
ply the Judiciary Law's misleading "criminal" and "civil" labels. In
regulating the judiciary's inherent contempt powers, the legislature
probably uncritically attached "criminal" and "civil" labels to the
judiciary's functional definitions of its contempt powers. "Many
have observed ... that the categories, 'civil' and 'criminal'
contempt, are unstable in the6ry and problematic in practice."'97
A revised contempt statute should refer to "criminal" contempts as
punitive and "civil" contempts as coercive.
Beyond erroneously applying and confusing the nomenclature,
functional definitions and purposes of contempt law, New York
courts have failed to adequately exercise their contempt power
because they also misinterpret many of its basic concepts. For
example, the Court of Appeals has sometimes stated that a criminal
contempt requires proof of a higher level of willfulness than civil
contempt. 98 By qualitatively confounding criminal contempt's
196 People exrel. Munsell v. Court of Oyer & Terminer, 101 N.Y. 245, 247,
4 N.E. 259, 259 (1886).
' International Union - United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 114 S.
Ct. 2552, 2566 (1994) (Ginsburg, J. & Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
'" See, e.g., Department of Envtl. Protection v. Department of Envtl.
Conservation, 70 N.Y.2d 233, 240, 513 N.E.2d 706, 709, 519 N.Y.S.2d 539, 542
(1987); McCormick v. Axelrod, 59 N.Y.2d 574, 583, 453 N.E.2d 508, 512, 466
N.Y.S.2d 279, 283, amended, 60 N.Y.2d 652, 454 N.E.2d 1314, 467 N.Y.S.2d
571 (1983). But cf County of Rockland v. Civil Service Employees Ass'n, Inc.,
JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
mens rea of willfulness,'99 New York's courts have introduced
confusion into the law and encouraged the arbitrary imposition or
withholding of contempt sanctions. The courts' inconsistent
definition of "evasive testimonial contempt" has also detracted from
the effective use of their contempt power. These definitions have
gone beyond logical necessity to the point of almost poetic
200permutation, thus preventing the courts from making a reason-
ably uniform assessment of whether a witness has offered evasive
testimony.
New York trial courts are also subject to the vague, confusing
and contradictory instruction of higher courts. For example, the last
word is yet to be written about double jeopardy considerations
circumscribing the in tandem use of Penal and Judiciary Law
contempt for separate but transactionally-related grand jury
misconduct. As the law now stands, a flat refusal to answer or
produce evidence may or may not be bifurcated into two
contempts--one of the grand jury and one of the court-for the
purpose of successive prosecution and punishment.2°'
62 N.Y.2d 11, 16,464 N.E.2d 121, 123,475 N.Y.S.2d 817, 819 (1984) ("[Piroof
to establish criminal contempt is proof beyond a reasonabale doubt . ... In
criminal contempt cases ... it is required that the evidence establish the willful
violation of the court order beyond a reasonable doubt.").
199 In New York, willfulness historically meant intentional. See, e.g., People
ex rel. Negus v. Dwyer, 90 N.Y. 402, 406 (1882) ("The revised statutes distin-
guished, and the Civil Code preserves the distinction, between criminal
contempts, and proceedings as for contempt in civil cases. As it respects
disobedience to the orders of a court, the sole difference appears to be that a
willful' disobedience [intentional] is a criminal contempt while a mere
disobedience [i.e., without intent to disobey] by which the right of a party to an
action is defeated or hindered is treated otherwise"); Munsell, 101 N.Y. at 248-
49, 4 N.E. at 260 ("As described in the statute, an element of willfulness, or of
evil intention enters into and characterizes them.")
200 See supra note 62.
201 United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993); see United States v.
Ryan, 810 F.2d 650 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Garcia, 755 F.2d 984, 987,
989 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Esposito, 633 F. Supp. 544 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(Imprisonment for civil contempt for refusal to obey court's order to testify
under 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) followed by indictment and conviction for contempt
under 18 U.S.C. § 401; double jeopardy claim found without merit with no
citation of Colombo and Menna cases, see supra notes 22-29).
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An example of a contradictory instruction from the Court of
Appeals is the notion that a Judiciary Law criminal contempt
arising out of a grand jury proceeding may be freely purged. This
notion often produces anomalous and counterproductive applica-
tions of the law. Purgation certainly conflicts with the Court of
Appeals' complaints that "as a practical matter ... a Grand Jury is
but a temporary body" and "the delays occasioned by the refusals
of recalcitrant witnesses to comply with Grand Jury subpoenas are
a very real concern."2 °2 It also invites experimentation with
disobedience and is insensitive to statutes of limitation for crimes
that are not tolled by the delays occasioned by meritless motions to
quash followed by contempt proceedings thereafter. Indeed,
purgation should be the rare exception, not the rule. Undoubtedly,
it should be limited to mitigation of punishment. °3
In addition to facilitating and expediting grand jury investiga-
tions and trial proceedings, New York contempt law should uphold
the decorum of the courtroom. After all, the American courtroom
is not a back alley or a meeting hall. The law should return to
basics and practicality concerning contempts committed in the
immediate view and presence of the court. The law should
recognize the summary contempt power through its history and
logic for what it is-the necessary solution to a very practical
problem. Unwarranted judicial timidity or ineptitude, self-inflicted
or otherwise, is as unseemly as overreaction. 2 4 Trial courts must
202 Virag v. Hynes, 54 N.Y.2d 437, 443, 430 N.E.2d 1249, 1252, 446
N.Y.S.2d 196, 199 (1981) (emphasis added). Apparently unimpressed, the Virags
themselves were convicted of criminal contempt in the second degree for
disobeying the very subpoena the Court of Appeals sustained. People v. Virag,
100 A.D.2d 984, 474 N.Y.S.2d 158 (2d Dep't), leave denied, 63 N.Y.2d 713,
469 N.E.2d 117, 480 N.Y.S.2d 817 (1984).
203 See, e.g., People v. Williamson, 136 A.D.2d 497, 523 N.Y.S.2d 817 (1st
Dep't 1988).
204 For a glaring example of Monday-morning quarterbacking regarding a
trial court's use of summary contempt-based on a clear misconstruction of
precedent, including the philosophically, legally and historically erroneous notion
that summary contempt "is inherently violative of fundamental notions of due
process... ."-see Werlin v. Goldberg, 129 A.D.2d 334, 343-47, 917 N.Y.S.2d
745, 750-52 (2d Dep't 1987) (dissenting opinion); see also Breitbart v. Galligan,
135 A.D.2d 323, 525 N.Y.S.2d 219 (1st Dep't 1988).
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deal with the rough and tumble of the courtroom. Appellate
decisions, however, are on the verge of construing or obfuscating
the immediate-view-and-presence contempt powers of trial courts
out of existence, while simultaneously emphasizing the need for
order in the courtroom. This jurisprudential phenomenon calls to
mind the old saw about the man who sought to prove that he could
keep a horse alive by starving it. When he proved his point, the
horse died.
One method of preserving the dignity of the New York
courtroom and respect for the rule of law as the only bulwark
against the law of the street would be for the legislature to increase
the punishment presently authorized by New York Judiciary Law
section 751. In light of the "petty offense" standard and contempo-
rary economic reality,20 5  the courts should enjoy greater
flexibility in determining appropriate punishment for an individual
contemnor and, in the context of an ongoing grand jury investiga-
tion, for deterring similar conduct by others. The former permissi-
ble fine of $250 was first specified many years ago. A large
amount of money then, time made it a nuisance fee of piddling
proportions. 2" Eventually, the New York State Legislatureincreased it slightly to $1,000.207 Expanding the limit on
205 Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968); Rankin v. Shanker, 23 N.Y.2d
111, 242 N.E.2d 802, 295 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1968).
206 Eastern Concrete Steel Co. v. Bricklayers' and Mason Plasterers' Int'l
Union, 200 A.D. 714, 193 N.Y.S.2d 368 (4th Dep't 1922); Code Civ. Procedure
art. 2, § 9 (1877).
207 Rankin, 23 N.Y.2d at 119-20, 242 N.E.2d 802, 295 N.Y.S.2d 625; N.Y.
JUD. LAW §751(1). International Union - United Mine Workers of America v.
Bagwell, 114 S. Ct. 2552, 2562 n.5 (1994), has recently complicated, but
certainly not prevented, an additional increase of the present $1,000 fine. In
Bagwell, the Court held that a "serious criminal contempt fine" is also subject
to the jury trial requirement set forth in Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
However, in Bagwell,. the Court refused to specifically designate what amount
constitutes a "serious criminal contempt fine." It only estimated that it was
somewhere between $10,000 and $52,000,000. Consequently, New York can pick
a number in between and take its chances or it could adopt a means test for
determining when a criminal contempt fine is "serious" and warrants ajury trial.
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imprisonment for contempt from thirty days to six months and
raising the fine to at least a maximum of $10,000 is as constitu-
tional as it is overdue.20 8
208 International Union - United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 114 S.
Ct. 2552 (1994); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968).

